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Abstract 
Previous studies have found clear differences in profitability between Norwegian and 
multinational firms operating in Norway under the dual income tax systems prior to 2006. 
It is corporations that only operate in Norway that is found to be the most profitable, 
which suggests profit shifting by international firms. One problem with these studies is 
that none of them account for the fact that in some circumstances, it would be preferable 
for owners who also are employed in the same corporation to receive labor compensation 
as dividends rather than wages. I try to control for this in my estimation on data between 
2006 and 2011. I find that profitability in corporations where the chairman of the board 
also is the CEO is higher, and like in previous studies I find a lower profitability in foreign 
controlled firms. Surprisingly however, I find no differences in profitability between 
domestic Norwegian and Norwegian multinational corporations. 
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1. Introduction 
In the past 12 months there have been several revelations in British media with regards to 
multinational companies and the lack of their taxable income. In Britain, considerable 
attention has been given to both Starbucks and Google during the fall and winter of 2012. A 
four month investigation by Reuters published on bbc.co.uk revealed that Starbucks has only 
paid £8.6 million in income taxes since its establishment in the UK in 1998, of a turnover of 
more than £3 billion in the same period (Bergin, 2012). According to The Independent, 
Google Chairman Eric Schmidt is proud of his company’s tax avoidance scheme, calling it 
“capitalism” (Kumar & Wright, 2012). The same article also states that Google sheltered £11 
billion pounds of its revenue in Bermuda in 2011, a known tax haven. 
Numbers published by the Norwegian Tax Administration on nrk.no, Skatteetaten, reveals 
that 6 out of 10 corporations operating in Norway did not pay tax in 2011 due to either zero 
or negative taxable profit (Sættem, 2013). Skatteetaten also reported that an estimated 29 
billion NOK has been wrongfully withheld from taxation by corporations operating in 
Norway (Tomter, 2013). Half of this amount is estimated to be from internal sales between 
companies across borders. Though corporations in Norway are no less susceptible to profit 
shifting than British corporations, few have been singled out like in Britain. Leftist 
newspaper Klassekampen published an article on the 25th of January 2013 naming 5 large 
corporations that paid little or no taxes in Norway for the financial year 2011 (Ekeberg, 
2013). 
During the previous three decades, the information age and globalization has connected the 
world’s nations in trade. Since 1980, the volume of trade has increased more than ten times, 
measured in global exports in US dollars at today’s value, according to the World Trade 
Organization (WTO, 2013). With the increase in trade came the increase in multinational 
corporations. According to the UN Conference On Trade And Development (UNCTAD) 
there were 35 000 transnational corporations (TNCs) with more than 150 000 affiliates in 
1992 (UNCTAD, 1992). In 2009, this number has increased to 82 000 TNCs and more than 
800 000 affiliates. (UNCTAD, 2009) 
Each TNC thus has an average number of affiliated companies just shy of 10. As the 
designation Transnational Corporation indicate, some of these affiliates are located in a 
different country than the parent unit. One of the largest TNCs, General Electric, is present 
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in more than 150 countries according to the facts sheet on the corporation’s webpage. When 
a corporation has a corporate structure spread over several nations, the opportunity for profit 
shifting exists. Some of the countries a TNC is located in will have a higher tax rate than 
others. By shifting the profit from affiliates in high-tax countries to affiliates in low-tax 
countries, TNCs can improve financial performance and return to their shareholders. 
Neither Norway nor Britain has a particularly high corporate tax rate. In Norway, the 
corporate tax rate is 28%, and in Britain it is between 20% and 24%. Compared to the 
Bahamas however, where the corporate tax rate is 0%, one realizes that incentives for profit 
shifting exist in both countries. The popularity of tax havens such as the Bahamas is further 
underlined by a report by the US Public Interest Research Group from April of 2012. The 
report states that 83 of the 100 largest publicly traded US corporations maintain revenues in 
tax havens, as of 2008. According to the same report, congressional studies suggests that $60 
billion USD in taxable revenue is annually placed in tax havens by US corporations. 
There are two main strategies for corporate profit shifting from high-tax countries to low-tax 
countries. The first is to finance the subsidiaries in countries with a high tax rate with debt 
from the parent corporation or other subsidiaries, while keeping equity in low tax countries. 
This strategy is generally referred to as thin-capitalization (Russo et al. 2007, pp 108). In 
several countries, among them Norway, interest costs are tax deductible. By financing an 
affiliate with debt rather than equity, the parent company retains a larger part of the 
affiliate’s earnings before taxes.  
Several of the OECD countries have imposed restrictions that limit capital structure, and 
deny tax deductions of interest on intra-company debt if the capital structure exceeds certain 
limits. Norway has no specific laws limiting thin-capitalization (PWC, 2012, pp 627-639), 
though there is legal precedence on thin capitalization in certain sectors (Schjelderup, 2012). 
This is likely to change in the future. Prime Minister Stoltenberg announced in a speech May 
1
st
. that the government would seek to limit tax deductible interest costs if the debt is 
internal. A study by Buettner et al. (2006) finds that an increase in tax rate of 10% results in 
a corresponding increase in leverage ratio (debt to total assets) of between 3.4 and 4.4 
percentage points. The same study also found that in countries that limit capital structure the 
leverage ratio of firms is about 5 percentage points lower. 
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The second method and the object of study in this thesis is the internal transfer pricing in 
corporations across borders. A corporation can increase its profits by charging a higher 
internal transfer price to a subsidiary located in country with a higher tax rate than the parent 
corporation.  As most costs are tax deductible, a high transfer price will reduces the taxable 
profit for the affiliate in a high-tax country. The difference between the artificial and actual 
transfer price is then taxed in a low-tax country. 
Both Norway and OECD have similar guidelines governing the internal transfer of goods 
and services across borders. All prices of internal transfers in Norway and in OECD are 
subject to the so-called arm´s length principle (“ALP”, Skatteloven §13-4, Regnskapsloven 
§4-1). This principle requires that transactions between related parties are comparable to 
documented transactions between unrelated parties. While this principle should in theory put 
a limit to artificial high or low transfer pricing, strict application of the principle is often 
impossible (Bartelsman & Beetsma, 2003). 
For instance, there are no comparable prices for many internal transfers. This is often true for 
licenses to use intellectual property such as patents and brand name belonging to the parent 
corporation. In a world characterized by liberal markets, intangibles as mentioned above are 
important to sustain a competitive advantage. A specialized knowledge-intense asset with no 
other applications and users other than the intended buyer of the asset may also prove 
difficult to price fairly. An example of such an asset could be subsea drilling equipment 
custom made to interact with other firm specific equipment. 
It should come as no surprise then that some member countries of OECD already 
acknowledge the shortcomings of the arm’s length principle. According to NTB, in an article 
published on dn.no in February, 2013, the ministers of finance in Britain, France and 
Germany called out for new coordinated international initiatives to combat corporations 
shifting profits across borders. General Secretary of OECD, Angel Gurria, underlines that 
the practice is within the limits of the law, calling for changes to the law (NTB, 2013). 
Though legal, many consider the method of which multinational corporations shift profits 
abroad to be unfair. Local corporations may be competing for financial investments with an 
international corporation with a parent in a tax haven. All else equal, investors will prefer to 
invest in the corporation in the tax haven. Nations are also competing for corporate revenues, 
indicated by the falling corporate tax rates of OECD in the previous decades. 
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2. Methods in literature 
Taxation of corporations has been studied for as long as corporations have been taxed. There 
are countless of studies conducted in different countries (Devereux, 2006). To determine if 
corporations profit shift there are in general two approaches; the direct and the indirect 
method. 
2.1 The direct method 
The direct method is comparing the prices of internal sales in multinational corporations to 
sales between independent parties. If it is found that the internal transfer price is different 
from the price in a transaction between independent parties, it may be reasonable to assume 
that this could be for tax purposes.  
One study using the direct method is Bernard et al. (2006), who use data from US customs 
consisting of US exports from 1993 up to and including 2000. Exporters in the US must 
declare whether the export is to an unrelated party at arm’s length, or if the transaction is 
between related parties. This gives the authors a set of data where it is possible to match 
firms and products, and compare prices when goods are exported to unrelated and related 
parties. Bernard et al. (2006) found that the average arm’s length prices are 43 percent 
higher than the related price. This indicates that multinational corporations are shifting 
profits away from the US by exporting goods cheaply to affiliates abroad; thereby reducing 
the taxable income in the US based affiliate. The authors further finds that the difference in 
transfer prices is larger for differentiated goods than standardized goods. Arm’s length 
transactions are priced 66.7% higher than for related parties when exporting differentiated 
goods. For standardized commodities the gap is “only” 8.8%. 
While the direct method may be the most precise method when trying to determine if 
corporations shift their profits to low-tax countries, data may be hard to come by. First of all, 
corporations that knowingly alter their internal transfer prices will not give up their 
reasoning behind the difference in prices unless ordered to do so by law or investigative 
authorities. Second, several internal transfers are specific to the organization, meaning that 
alternative use and market prices outside of the organization may be difficult or impossible 
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to find. Due to limited data being available, there are not many studies where the direct 
method is used (Balsvik et al. 2009). 
2.2 The indirect method 
Unlike the direct method, data for the indirect method is easier to compile and get access to. 
All necessary data can be found in financial statements combined with other publicly 
available sources. An example of the indirect method is to measure the profitability, or 
taxable income of a corporation in relation to turnover explained by a set of variables. This 
set of variables will include factors that are believed to affect profitability, including 
variables that distinguish multinational from domestic firms. The idea is to control for as 
many factors as possible. The remaining unobserved difference in profitability between 
domestic and foreign firms will then be captured by the coefficient of the group variable 
indicating foreign or multinational firms. A negative coefficient for either group could 
indicate profit shifting. 
One of the earliest studies using the indirect method is “Explaining the Low Taxable Income 
of Foreign Controlled Companies in the United States” by Grubert et al. from 1993. The 
authors use a panel of US firms between 1980 and 1987 to find observable significant 
characteristics that influence the profit margin of firms. The remaining unobservable 
difference in profit between multinational and domestic corporations is said by the authors to 
be the upper bound of profit shifting. Grubert et al. find that 50% of this difference can be 
attributable to special characteristics of foreign controlled corporations, not transfer pricing. 
An improved study by Grubert (1997) improves the model specification and utilizes newer 
data. In this study, Grubert concludes that up to 75% of the profitability differential can be 
explained by systematic differences between multinational and national corporations. 
2.3 The unobserved profitability difference 
Even though previous literature find profitability differences between domestic and 
international firms using the indirect method, it’s far from certain exactly to which extent 
corporations shift income. The profitability differential is unobserved, and thus it may be a 
result of other factors. For instance, expansion is expensive. Especially this holds true for 
international expansion, and corporations run the risk of a failed expansion (Contractor et al, 
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2002). Development and execution of the strategic plan must be of the highest level in order 
to ensure international success, which can be costly. Few corporations enjoy immediate 
international success. Like for any investment, much of the costs connected to 
internationalization are realized at the start of the project, while the income usually is 
realized later (Contractor et al, 2002). This fact may influence profitability of multinational 
corporations in an expansion phase, or corporations that become multinational in the analysis 
period. 
This should then also hold true for international corporations expanding to Norway. The 
Norwegian affiliate may suffer from a low profitability in the startup phase. Norwegian 
corporations acquired by foreign enterprises may also experience a fall in profitability. 
Restructuring such as rebranding, reeducation of employees and replacing leadership are 
factors that are costly, but which may be necessary in a newly acquired affiliate. Kinney and 
Lawrence (2000) suggest that corporations that are subject to a foreign takeover are less 
operationally mature and suffer from higher startup costs and low revenue typical for new 
businesses. Balsvik and Heller (2009) find that foreign acquisitions in Norway typically are 
of firms in growth, contradicting the hypothesis of Kinney and Lawrence (2000). Still, one-
time costs in relation to the acquisition must be expected, and thus may influence 
profitability of corporations that recently have become foreign controlled. 
Additionally, profit shifting between affiliates may not always be solely for financial gain. 
Bergstrand (2009) argues there may be other reasons to why the internal transfer price may 
be different between different subsidiaries, such as creating financial incentives for managers 
and profit sharing between the consolidated divisions. Devereux and Keuschnigg (2009) 
further argue that a corporation in a high tax country may pay high transfer prices in order to 
increase the free cash flow of an affiliate, as having a high free cash flow increases the 
availability of external financing for the affiliate. The authors claim that transfer prices 
serves an important function to coordinate production units in multinational corporations, 
and thus are not merely a tool for tax minimization. Practices such as these however are not 
allowed by the arm’s length principle of OECD.  
Due to the nature of this difference, it is not possible to estimate how much of it is caused by 
profit shifting. It could possibly be caused by other factors, as described above. Profit 
shifting does however remain a likely explanation, at least for some of the unobserved 
difference. Nearly every scientific research project thus far finds profitability differences 
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between international and domestic firms. Some larger firms do not even hide the fact that 
they shift profit between nations, which gives the impression that profit shifting is a common 
occurrence, especially in large firms. Finally, it is important to keep in mind that most of 
these practices are in fact legal. Internal transfer prices should be set according to the arm’s 
length principle. Due to the difficulties in pricing intangibles and specialized equipment 
however, managers often have discretion to set the transfer prices as they wish. 
2.4 Studies on profit shifting and tax levels 
Several studies have shown that differences in profitability between domestic and 
multinational firms depend on the different tax levels the corporation and its affiliates face. 
Harris et al. (1993) found that US corporations with affiliates in low tax countries pay less 
tax than comparable corporations with affiliates in high tax countries. Klassen et al. (1993) 
conducted a similar study, where they analyzed profit shifting by multinational corporations 
in response to changes in corporate taxes between 1984 and 1990. Their conclusion is that 
income shifting can be related to the corporate tax rates and changes in it in different nations.  
Harris (1993) also concludes that flexible, or intangibles intensive corporations shifted 
income to the US after the Tax Reforms Act of 1986. Dischinger and Riedel (2011) find 
evidence for their hypothesis; that multinational corporations place and/or develop intangible 
assets in research centers located in low-tax countries. This is profitable as it allows the 
affiliate in the low tax country to expensively license intellectual property to other affiliates. 
The authors name Vodafone as an example of a corporation which has relocated its 
intangibles to a subsidiary in Ireland, a country with low corporate taxes. Dischinger and 
Riedel (2011) argue that this pattern is driven by two motivations; to save taxes on 
intangibles, and to move income from production centers in high-tax locations by pricing 
intangible input factors artificially high. 
2.5 Studies conducted in Norway 
In Norway there have been two large studies about multinational corporations and profit 
shifting. Both aim to determine the difference in tax between international and domestic 
corporations by using the indirect method. In a historical perspective, the Norwegian tax rate 
has been quite low compared to their OECD trading partners. As such, one would expect that 
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some corporations would find it profitable to shift profits to Norway rather than out of the 
country (Balsvik et al., 2009). Both of the Norwegian studies do however find that foreign 
controlled corporations have a lower taxable income to sales ratio than domestic firms. 
The first of these two studies is Langli and Saudagaran’s “Taxable income differences 
between foreign and domestic controlled corporations in Norway” from 2004. The study 
uses a sample of small and medium sized Norwegian firms in the manufacturing and 
wholesale sectors, from 1993 to 1996. The authors find that after controlling for start-up 
costs, size, industry affiliation, leverage and capital intensity, there is a difference in tax 
between foreign controlled (FCC) and domestic controlled corporations (DCC). Descriptive 
statistics indicate that DCCs have a profit margin of 4.8% while FCCs have a profit margin 
of 2.1%, a difference of 2.7 percentage points. In their OLS regression model, the authors 
estimate this difference to be 2.6 percentage points or similar to the descriptive analysis, 
indicating profit shifting by the FCCs. 
To check the robustness of their estimation, the authors also attempt to scale taxable income 
to assets or the book value of equity, without finding evidence contrarily to their conclusion. 
Langli and Saudagaran (2004) claim that their conclusion is unlikely to be attributable by the 
dominance of DCCs in the sample, or lack of control variables. One problem with this study 
however is as Balsvik et al. (2009) also point out; Langli and Saudagaran (2004) do not 
control for the fact that some of the DCCs in their sample may have a foreign affiliate, and 
thus have the same opportunity to profit shift as the FCCs. One can hardly argue that 
Norwegian owners are less susceptible to profit shift than foreign owners. This problem is 
not addressed by Langli and Saudagaran, thus their estimated difference of 2.6 percentage 
points could quite possibly be negatively biased. 
The problem is however addressed in the second major study in Norway, “Kunnskapsstatus 
for hva økonomisk forskning har avdekket om flernasjonale selskapers internprising i 
Norge” by Balsvik, Jensen, Møen and Tropina from 2009. The authors of this report control 
for foreign Norwegian affiliates, and include other sectors than manufacturing and 
wholesale. Additionally, the dataset contains observations over a longer period of time, from 
1993 to 2005. 
While the authors are unable to replicate the results of Langli and Saudagaran (2004), they 
find the difference in taxable income to turnover ratio between multinational and national 
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corporations to be 1.6 percentage points in the period 1993-1996. Like Langli and 
Saudagaran however, the authors find that it is the foreign controlled corporations that are 
the least profitable. Even when Balsvik et al. (2009) include the additional years of data they 
have available in their analysis and control for firm specific effects, the coefficient do not 
change much. Using their whole sample, the authors find a coefficient of 1.64 percentage 
points, which indicates a stable difference in profitability between multinational and 
Norwegian firms in the retail and manufacturing sector. 
Balsvik et al. (2009) additionally expands their analysis to include other sectors than those 
found in Langli and Saudagaran (2004). When excluding firms in the petroleum and 
extraction sectors the authors finds a difference in taxable income to turnover ratio of 3.93 
percentage points using OLS and 2.38 percentage points when controlling for firm specific 
effects. Interestingly the authors find that profitability differences also are sector dependent. 
The largest difference is found in the finance, real estate, and professional services sector 
with a coefficient of 7.42 percentage points in OLS, and 3.93 percentage points after 
controlling for and removing firm specific effects. 
Assuming that the indicated unobserved profitability difference is due to profit shifting, and 
based on their results from the OLS and fixed effects estimations, the authors estimate that 
the taxable income for corporations operating in Norway is between 15 and 26 billion NOK 
(measured at 2008 prices) lower than it should have been. This number is comparable to the 
29 billion NOK that the Norwegian Tax Administration reports as withheld from taxation, of 
which half is assumed to relate to profit shifting by internal transfer pricing.
1
 
In addition to the major studies mentioned above, several master theses have been written 
about profit shifting and tax avoidance in Norway, some of which are publicly available. 
“Profit Shifting in Norway” from 2007 and the later report “Taxable Income Differences 
Between Multinational and Domestic Corporations in Norway: A Panel Data Approach” 
from 2010 by Julia Tropina is the first report using a panel data approach on Norwegian 
firms to determine differences in the taxable income to turnover ratio. 
                                                 
1 See section 1 for details. 
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2.6 The dual income tax system 
There is however one problem that has yet to be addressed in studies of profit shifting in 
Norwegian firms. All of the studies mentioned so far have been using a dataset that ends 
before 2006, meaning that corporations in the sample were taxed under the dual income tax 
system of 1992-2005. Before the tax reform act of 2006, the marginal tax rate on personal 
income or wages could be as high as 59% (Alstadsæter & Wangen, 2010). Comparatively, 
the marginal tax rate on dividends could be as low as 28%. In 2006, the marginal tax rate on 
personal income was lowered to a maximum of 47.8%, while the marginal tax rate of 
dividends was increased to 48.16% in order to address this unbalance in taxation. 
Prior to 2006, owners who were employed in their own corporations could possibly opt to 
receive no wages, but rather receive dividends. Clearly, if the owners themselves could 
chose to either receive dividends or wages it is hard to imagine they would opt for the higher 
taxed personal income, when dividends were taxed at a lower rate. The owners could receive 
dividends taxed at only 28% if the corporation was taxed at the widely held regime. 
Corporations were taxed at the widely held regime if the active owner owned less than two-
thirds of the corporation. If the active owner held more than this amount, the corporation 
were taxed at the closely held regime and dividends would be taxed at a higher rate. These 
different regimes gave owners who sold or traded away one third of their corporation the 
possibility to receive payment for their labour as low taxed dividends, rather than high taxed 
wages. Considering the payroll tax of 14.1% that corporations have to pay in addition to 
wages, it was even more lucrative to receive labour compensation as dividends for owners 
employed in their own corporation. 
Alstadsæter and Wangen (2010) analyse how corporations respond to tax incentives under 
the mentioned tax regime. Their analysis suggests that the corporations under the widely 
held regime had up to a 41% higher profit than comparable corporations taxed under the 
closely held regime. Alstadsæter and Wangen (2010) find that the probability of being taxed 
under the widely held regime increase with the size of assets, and falls with labour costs. 
This indicates that owners of small corporations, who had the most to gain, adapted their 
ownership structure in order to be taxed under the widely held regime. 
Prior studies of income shifting in Norway have found a difference in profitability, or the 
taxable income to turnover ratio between international and domestic Norwegian 
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corporations. In these studies, domestic Norwegian corporations were found to be more 
profitable. Assuming that the typical corporation where the owner also is employed in the 
corporation is a small or medium sized domestic Norwegian firm, some of the difference 
found in profitability may be due to the fact that some corporations were taxed under the 
widely held regime, where the owner chose to receive dividends rather than wages. By 
reducing the wage cost, and receive labour compensation as dividends, profitability increase. 
Parts of this effect may have been captured by the size dummies in previous studies, as size 
did correlate with corporations under the widely held regime (Alstadsæter and Wangen, 
2010). 
Tropina (2010) is the only one who has attempted to control for the possibility that 
multinational corporations pay higher wages than national corporations. She introduces 
wages as a share of total costs as a proxy variable for the wage level of firms, in order to 
capture the effect of this possibility. This proxy variable has one flaw however. Assuming 
that multinational corporations do profit shift their income abroad by setting high internal 
transfer prices, their costs will naturally be higher than comparable Norwegian corporations. 
Tropina’s wages to cost ratio may thus be biased by both artificially high costs and wages in 
multinational corporations. In short, the assumed higher wages could be partly neutralized by 
the assumed higher costs. Tropina (2010) finds that foreign controlled corporations has a 
lower wage cost share of total cost than domestic corporations. This suggests that the 
variable may be influenced by other factors as explained above. 
The wage as dividends problem will partly have solved itself, as the marginal tax rate gap 
between dividends and labour has been reduced in the post 2006 tax regime. However, the 
tax system still enables dividends that partly can be withdrawn to a tax rate of 28%. If the 
amount withdrawn is less than or equal to the risk free return on invested capital 
(“Skjermingsfradraget”, Skatteloven §12-12), the marginal tax rate will be 28%. For every 
NOK above this amount, the marginal tax rate will be 48.16%. This is the reason why 
owners withdrew large dividends from their corporations in 2005 in Norway. By injecting 
the withdrawn dividends as equity, owners increased invested capital and thus the amount 
that can be withdrawn at a tax rate of 28% in the future.  
However, even after the given risk free return is reached, it may still be profitable for the 
owners to receive wage as dividends. Including the payroll taxes, marginal tax rate on labour 
could reach 54.25%. As the example in figure 1 indicate, after “Skjermingsfradraget” up to 
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200 000 NOK it will be most profitable to receive compensation as labour wages up to 490 
000 NOK. After this amount however, it will be more profitable to receive compensation as 
dividends. Though receiving wage as dividends is not as lucrative as during the previous tax 
regime, this may still affect estimated coefficients on the difference in profitability between 
international and domestic corporations. 
 
Figure 1: Marginal tax rates by income 
It will be interesting to find out if the differences found by Langli and Saudagaran in 2004 
and Balsvik et al. in 2010 still holds with newer data from after the tax reforms act of 2006, 
or if Norwegian owners are making their corporations artificially profitable in order to 
increase their post-tax income by opting to receive dividends rather than wages as labour 
compensation. 
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3. Problem formulation 
3.1 Hypotheses 
This thesis will utilize data post the 2006 tax regime in Norway. The purpose of the thesis is 
to find out if international corporations have a lower profitability than comparable domestic 
Norwegian corporations, which could indicate profit shifting. Also, I want to compare results 
from the new tax regime with the results of the studies conducted with data from the old dual 
income tax system, while controlling for the fact that it may be possible for some owners to 
receive wage as dividends. My null hypotheses are thus as follows
2
: 
[H1] H0: Corporations where the owner is employed are equally profitable as corporations 
where the owner is not employed. 
[H2] H0: Foreign Controlled Corporations (FCCs) are equally profitable as Domestic 
Norwegian Corporations (DNCs). 
[H3] H0: Norwegian Multinational Corporations (NMCs) are equally profitable as Domestic 
Norwegian Corporations (DNCs).  
I will test [H1] by including the variable which indicates if the owner is employed in the 
same corporation in the test for hypotheses [H2] and [H3]. This will allow me to estimate to 
which extent the previous Norwegian studies may have been biased in the event that [H1] is 
rejected.  
Hypotheses [H2] and [H3] are two-sided. There reason for the two-sided test is that there is a 
possibility that for some corporations, Norway will be a low tax country. For these 
corporations there are incentives to shift profit to Norway for taxation, which can lead to a 
taxable income that is higher in multinational than in Norwegian corporations. The direction 
of the bias depends on to which extent revenue is shifted to or away from Norway. It is 
necessary to test both hypotheses in order to find comparable results with the previous 
studies in Norway. Further, it’s not certain that the only incentive for profit shifting is to 
reduce taxes. Other factors might be of importance, which also calls for a two sided test. 
                                                 
2 See section 4.3 for the definition of the nationality groups (DNC/FCC/NMC). 
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3.2 Choice of method 
In this thesis I will utilize both descriptive statistics and the indirect method in order to 
answer the hypotheses in 3.1. The indirect method is also the method used in the previous 
studies of profit shifting in Norway, which will give me the opportunity to compare my 
results with the results of previous Norwegian studies. While the direct method is the 
preferred method and probably would give a better understanding of the extent to which 
corporations operating in Norway profit shift, the necessary data is hard to come by. The 
necessary data for the indirect method is in its entirety publicly available for researchers. 
Like in previous studies utilizing the indirect method, I will estimate the unobserved 
profitability differential between the different groups of firms using both OLS and fixed 
effects. 
3.3 Control for ownership 
I will control for the fact that in some circumstances, it will still be preferable for owners 
who is employed in the same corporation to receive labour compensation as dividends 
instead of wages. Unlike previous studies however, I do this by introducing a variable which 
indicates if the chairman of the board is the same person as the CEO. This variable is a proxy 
variable which indicates where it is possible that the owner is employed, and has the option 
of receiving dividends as compensation. As such, it may not capture the entire effect of 
dividends as compensation, but it is in my opinion a good approximation. 
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4. Data 
4.1  Sources 
The data utilized in this thesis is gathered and prepared by the Norwegian Tax 
Administration (Skatteetaten). It contains data from several governmental sources, which are 
listed below. The dataset is of high quality with few common data-related problems such as 
missing values. The base dataset has 1.2 million observations and include more than 227 000 
corporations operating in Norway in the period 2006-2011. 
Entity Registry (Enhetsregisteret). 
The Norwegian Entity Registry was established in 1995 and aims to gather basic information 
about corporations collected by different governmental sources. It is not publicly available, 
but researchers can apply for and receive anonymized data. It contains information about 
employees, roles, and ownership making it possible to identify corporations where the 
Chairman of the Board or other board members also are employed as CEO. Additionally, the 
ownership data makes it possible to identify and separate foreign controlled and domestic 
controlled corporations.  
The registry also contains basic information such as the date the corporation was established, 
the NACE (sector) code of corporations, and which organizational form the corporation has. 
One problem with using this registry is that the NACE standard was changed in 2009, 
meaning that a corporation which has not changed industry may have changed NACE code. 
This is a problem, as manually recoding all of the NACE codes would take too long. I have 
solved this problem by replacing older NACE codes with the observed 2009 code. The 2009 
code will not exist for corporations that have gone bankrupt prior to 2009 so this operation 
will result in some missing values. Fortunately, these are few. Only around 12 000 
observations are missing their NACE code in the final sample after restrictions. 
Registry of Financial Statements (Regnskapsregisteret, Brønnøysund). 
Financial statements of all corporations are registered in “regnskapsregisteret” in 
Brønnøysund. The registry saves all financial information as reported by corporations 
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operating in Norway, in accordance with the standard “Norsk Kontoplan”. The financial 
information utilized in this thesis originates from this registry.  
As often is the case for large datasets containing financial information, there are some 
challenges. Most notably, the assets and equity & debt sides of the balance sheet do not 
always match up for the corporations. Setting z = Assets – Equity – Debt returns a value for 
z different from 0 for 434 515 of the total 1.2 million observations in the base sample, 
around 36% of the observations. The mean of the z values which are different from zero is 
120 220 NOK positive, indicating that the asset side is overvalued.  
As it is the asset side that is slightly overvalued, my first thought was that this could have 
been a result of minority interests being excluded from the reported equity. However, this is 
not in accordance with Regnskapsloven §6-5 which states that minority interest should be 
included in the sum of equity. By taking a closer look at the deviation I found that 9 419 
observations of z have an absolute value larger than 50 000 NOK, while 14 527 observations 
of z deviates from zero by more than 1 000 NOK. The small size of the deviation indicates 
that it is unlikely to originate from missing minority interests. It seems more likely that the 
difference in z is caused by a typing or archiving error. As I do not want these errors to 
influence my estimates, I’ve chosen to drop observations with an absolute z value greater 
than 1000 NOK. 
Controlled transactions and accounts outstanding (RF-1123). 
Every corporation that has transactions with related parties documents these transactions in 
RF-1123 and sends it to the Norwegian Tax Administration annually. The purpose is to 
control transactions that may or may not be used to profit shift. In this thesis, RF-1123 is 
used to identify corporations with foreign subsidiaries. Data for RF-1123 exists only for the 
years 2008 and after. This means that Norwegian corporations with foreign subsidiaries 
could possibly be classified as a domestic corporation prior to 2008. To correct for this, I’ve 
assumed that corporations with foreign affiliates in 2008 also had foreign affiliates in 2006 
and 2007. This assumption is supported by the fact that in 2008, the number of domestic 
corporations fell, indicating that some of them transitioned to the group with foreign 
affiliates. While unfortunate, the operation is absolutely necessary. If left unattended, the 
sudden change in status in 2008 for all of the multinational corporations will seriously 
influence my fixed effects estimations.  
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4.2 Dependent variable 
Both Langli & Saudagaran (2004) and Balsvik et al. (2010) use a specification first 
presented by Klassen et al. in 1993.  Their dependent variable and profitability measurement 
is taxable income in relation to sales, where taxable income (TI) is classified as: 
               
(                               )
     
  (1) 
where 
i  = Firm indicator; 
t  = Year indicator; 
NIBTit  = Net income before taxes for firm i in year t; 
DTLi,t = Deferred tax liability for firm i in year t; 
DTAi,t = Deferred tax assets for firm i in year t; 
TRi,t = Effective tax rate for firm i in year t, computed as (TEi,t / NIBTi,t) 
if TRi,t is in the range 0.1-0.6. TRi,t will be either be rounded up to 0.1 or 
down to 0.6 if otherwise. 
TEi,t = income tax expense for firm i in year t. 
 
In words, taxable income expresses a corporation’s result or net income before taxes, 
adjusted for deferred taxes. Taxable income in relation to sales may sometimes be referred 
to as profitability in this thesis, while a corporation’s total sales may be referred to as 
revenue or turnover. 
Corporations which have the means and will to profit shift will minimize their taxable 
income in high tax countries, while maximizing taxable income in low tax countries. 
Assuming that most corporations treat Norway as a high tax country, the expected result is a 
lower taxable income for corporations with the possibility to profit shift compared to 
corporations with similar revenue without the possibility to shift profits. As such, the taxable 
income in relation to turnover variable seems like a good dependent variable for the purpose 
of this thesis. Using ratios in empirical estimations can be problematic and result in spurious 
results (Kronmal, 1993), but as I want to find out if there are differences in profitability I 
have to use a profitability ratio, such as taxable income in relation to total sales. 
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Deferred tax assets or liabilities are divided by the tax rate as a corporations’ income tax 
expense does not directly translate to actual taxes paid due to timing differences for some 
costs and income items. A firm constructing an object over a long period of time may 
recognize parts of the agreed selling price in their financial statement prior to completion, 
even though the full amount may not be due before after completion (IAS 11). Tax 
authorities will not tax this type of income, as the cash inflows are yet to occur and all risk is 
still held by the seller. 
While tax on items that cause deferred tax expense may not yet have been paid, it will have 
been recognized simultaneously as revenue as a deferred tax liability, and thus increasing the 
income tax expense for the corporation. By  adjusting the net income before taxes with 
deferred taxes divided with the tax rate, the specification will have controlled for non-taxable 
income. The non-taxable part of the income will be removed and realized upon completion 
of the contract, rather than when recognized in financial statements. 
Small Norwegian corporations may choose whether or not recognize deferred tax assets. 
(NRS 8 God regnskapsskikk for små foretak). Different accounting practices could 
underestimate taxable income for the corporations that do not recognize deferred tax assets. I 
do not know to which extent  Norwegian firms utilizes this possibility, and this may affect 
the results of the thesis. From a rational point of view however, recognition is preferable as it 
will result in a higher equity than not recognizing the deferred tax asset.  
Klassen et al.’s (1993) specification uses the effective and not the statuary tax rate, which 
enables the authors to control for permanent differences between tax- and financial 
deductible costs. Permanent differences lead to a higher effective tax rate as these 
differences are costs which are deductible in financial statements, but not deductible for tax 
purposes. Though minor, the majority of permanent differences are firm specific. Using the 
effective tax rate in the model thus seems to be the rational choice, as using the statutory tax 
rate may lead to spurious results. 
As all the necessary data are available in firms’ financial statements or other publicly 
available sources, the specification is frequently used. Both the major studies of Norwegian 
firms have utilized this specification. It is also clear and easy to understand. As I see no 
major weaknesses with the specification other than the recognition problem for small 
Norwegian firms and the ratio issue, I have chosen to utilize this specification in this thesis.  
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4.3 Explanatory Variables 
Nationality: 
Corporations are divided into groups based on their nationality. The groups are defined as 
follows: 
 Domestic Norwegian Corporation (DNC) – this group contains the corporations that 
are not owned by foreign entities, have no foreign subsidiaries, and operate only in 
Norway. 
 Foreign Controlled Corporation (FCC) - this group contains corporations that are 
majority owned (>50%) by foreign entities, or has reported to authorities that they 
are a foreign entity, or has the organizational form “Norwegian Foreign Registered 
Corporation (NUF)”.   
 Norwegian Multinational Corporation (NMC) – this group contains corporations that 
are majority owned by Norwegian entities but has inter-corporate transactions with 
foreign affiliates.  
The benchmark groups in this thesis will be the DNCs. The resulting coefficient of each 
nationality group will indicate the unobserved profitability difference between domestic 
Norwegian and both FCCs and NMCs, which will give the answer to my hypotheses 
presented in section 3. 
 
Other explanatory variables: 
Industry/sector and year indicators. 
A sector indicator is included as different sectors experience different profitability. This is 
due to a number of reasons. An example is that while some sectors have weak entry barriers, 
others have stronger and enjoy a higher profitability as a result of the less intensive 
competition. The sector is determined on the basis of the corporations’ 3 digit NACE-code, 
which makes it possible to distinguish between the numerous sub-sectors within each 
industry. This variable is similarly included in both Tropina (2010) and Balsvik et al. (2009), 
but not in Langli & Saudagaran (2004). Langli & Saudagaran (2004) only distinguish 
between traditional industry and the retail sectors.  
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I’ve also included a year dummy that is meant to capture shocks in the economy that affects 
every firm. Such shocks may be changes to exchange rates, interest rates, and in 
salary/compensation negotiated by unions on a national level. 
 
Leverage ratio (IBD/TC). 
It’s necessary to include a leverage ratio in the analysis. Corporations with higher leverage 
will usually have higher financial expenses, reducing their taxable income. Corporations also 
have the possibility to profit shift by debt financing their subsidiaries. The leverage ratio 
controls for this possibility, though not perfectly as it is impossible to distinguish between 
intra-company and external debt with my dataset. It’s not possible to distinguish between 
interest bearing or non-interest bearing debt either, and the actual interest rate is unobserved, 
which further complicates the choice of leverage ratio. As corporations’ long term debt 
usually is non-operating and interest bearing, I’ve chosen to use long term debt to total 
capital as a leverage ratio. The expected sign for the coefficient of leverage ratio is negative, 
as interest payments reduce taxable income. 
 
Tangibility. 
As both Tropina (2010) and Balsvik et al. (2009) I’ve included an asset ratio in the 
estimation. Unlike their fixed assets to total assets ratio however, I use a ratio of tangible 
assets to total assets. I find it hard to argue that fixed assets should positively impact the 
taxable income of a corporation compared to a corporation which rents its equipment.  
 
While it is often expected that corporations which invest in research and development are 
more profitable in the long run, it’s difficult to predict the sign the coefficient of this ratio. 
The balance sheet does not indicate the true level of R&D in every firm. According to 
Regnskapsloven (§5-3) intangibles should be recognized in the balance sheet as an asset. 
However, corporations may choose to expense costs in R&D as they are incurred (Rskl. § 5-
6, IAS 38). Until steady state where depreciation of intangibles equal investment in 
intangibles, corporations that recognize its intangibles in the balance sheet should have a 
higher taxable income than corporations expensing R&D immediately. Valuation of 
intangible assets is difficult. Often intangibles have no other application than in which it is 
employed and in the corporation owning it, making it worthless to anyone else and as 
security for debt. Corporations with a greater ratio of tangible assets may thus enjoy cheaper 
financing, increasing taxable income. 
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Size. 
The different sizes of corporations will be captured by grouping the corporations by their 
total revenue. As in both Langli & Saudagaran (2004) and Balsvik et al. (2009) I will use 
dummies for each of the 5 quintiles of operating income. I use the first quintile containing 
the smallest corporations as the reference group. The dummy “Sales 2” will be of value 1 if 
the firm observed belong in the second sales quintile, and zero otherwise. The expected sign 
of the sales quintiles is positive, as larger corporations may enjoy greater economies of scale 
which will increase taxable income. However, as Tropina (2010) states, larger corporations 
may have increased incentives to shift profits. Tax planning and profit shifting can also be 
complex and expensive, as it requires specialized knowledge. Major firms have global tax 
strategies and executives with the sole purpose of minimizing taxes. (Russo et al. 2007, pp 
71-85).  This may affect the sign of the coefficient negatively, especially in the later quintiles 
containing the largest corporations. 
 
Age.  
This variable is included as it is likely that brand new corporations suffer from low initial 
profitability. Corporations are grouped in five groups after age, each group covering 5 years 
with the final group for corporations older than 20 years. I use the first group covering 
corporations younger than 5 years as the reference group. The expected sign of age is 
positive as corporations with weak business plans usually fail early, while profitable 
corporations remain in business. 
 
Financial income. 
Norwegian corporations pay 28% tax on 3% of financial income in the new post 2006 tax 
regime. Losses on financial instruments are not tax deductible. Foreign corporations are 
exempted from this rule, and pay nothing. In practice, this means that 3% of the income is 
realized in financial statements of Norwegian owned corporations and taxed accordingly. 
Unless I control for this income, omitted variable bias may attribute the increased income in 
Norwegian corporations to the nationality dummies. Though intuitive, I may get spurious 
results if I utilize the same denominator, income as in the dependent variable (Kronmal, 
1993). In this thesis, I use equity as the denominator for the financial income ratio. The 
expected sign of this variable is likely to be positive, as it increases taxable income if 
present. 
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Ownership. 
The ownership variable is a proxy variable intended to capture the effect that it may be in 
some circumstances preferential to receive compensation as dividends rather than wages. 
This could as previously described happen in corporations where the owner is employed in 
the same corporation. As such, the proxy is a dummy variable indicating if a corporations 
CEO and chairman of the board is the same person. This variable is only a proxy and is 
unlikely to capture the whole effect of employees who receives wages as dividends, though 
it indicates where this is possible. The expected sign of this variable is positive, as 
compensation in the form of dividends increases profitability in the corporation. It could also 
possibly be negative, as professional leadership may influence profitability positively. 
4.4 Sample Restrictions 
In this thesis I’ve chosen to restrict the sample in order to get as a homogenous sample as 
possible. I normalize the sample by excluding extreme and impossible values, which 
otherwise may impact my estimations. The first seven are based on the restrictions presented 
by Balsvik et al (2009) which again is based on restrictions presented by Langli & 
Saudagaran (2004).  
- The sample only includes limited liability corporations. 
- The sample excludes corporations with assets less than one million NOK. 
- The sample excludes corporations with negative sales income. 
- The sample excludes corporations which has a taxable income adjusted for deferred 
taxes to sales ratio greater than 1. 
- The sample excludes corporations that have a taxable income adjusted for deferred 
taxes to sales ratio which deviates by more than 50 % from the reported taxable 
income to sales ratio. 
- The sample excludes corporations that have an interest bearing debt to total capital 
ratio of less than 0 or greater than 3. 
- The sample excludes the petroleum and extraction sector.3 
                                                 
3 Balsvik et al. (2009) excludes the petroleum and extraction sector as it is subject to a special tax regime, and consists of 
extremely large corporations. Langli & Saudagaran (2004) includes only the Retail and Industry sectors. 
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Additionally, I’ve chosen to introduce the following restrictions which exclude 
impossible values: 
- The sample excludes corporations with negative sizes for intangible assets and 
corporations with intangible assets greater than the sum of total assets.  
- The sample excludes corporations which have assets that deviate with more than 
1000 NOK from the sum of equity and debt, or vica versa. It should be impossible to 
deviate from zero, but I allow some slack for registration and typing errors. 
- The sample excludes corporation with negative taxable financial income. This size 
cannot be negative, as it measures income. 
Finally, to avoid measurement error I exclude all observations of corporations which 
changes nationality or ownership status twice (See table 7, section 6 for details). The table 
below indicates the original amount of observations, and how many observations remain 
after each restriction.  
Table 1 – Sample Restrictions. Number of observations 
Restriction Total DNC FCC NMC Percentage 
Initial Sample 1 205 337 1 106 041 66 999 32 297 100 % 
Assets >= 1MNOK 836 166 768 323 36 128 31 715 69 % 
Income > 0 692 257 635 513 30 459 26 285 57 % 
|Adj. Taxable Income / Sales| <= 1 502 966 461 237 23 286 18 443 42 % 
|(Adj. Tax. Inc. – Tax. Inc. / Income)| < 0.5 492 357 451 848 22 845 17 664 41 % 
0 < Int. Bearing Debt./Tot. Capital < 3 491 583 451 202 22 730 17 651 41 % 
0 < Intangibles < Assets 491 449 451 101 22 706 17 642 41 % 
|Assets - Debt - Equity| < 1000 484 409 445 189 22 075 17 145 40 % 
Financial income >= 0 484 372 445 155 22 073 17 144 40 % 
No multiple status changes 473 460 436 565 21 054 15 841 39 % 
All sectors 473 460 436 565 21 054 15 841 39 % 
Removing Oil & Extraction 471 396 435 078 20 706 15 612 39 % 
Main Sample 471 396 435 078 20 706 15 612 39 % 
Each row contains the amount of observations left after each restriction. 
The final sample contains nearly 470 000 observations and more than 138 000 firms. 
Each corporation has an average of 3.4 observations. Using 3 digit NACE codes there are 
firms in 255 different sectors in the sample. Of the initial 1.2 million observations, 61% 
fail to meet all the restriction criterias.  
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5. Descriptive Statistics 
In this section I will present the sample descriptive statistics. The following table describes 
the amount of observations over time. 
 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Total 
Observations 12 792 86 480 88 858 91 492 94 481 97 293 471 396 
Table 2: Observations over time. 
As table 2 suggests, I have very few observations for the year 2006. While they are kept in 
sample statistics and in the estimations, I have left them out graphically in the figures 
throughout this chapter. I deem this necessary as the few observations in 2006 is of mostly 
larger corporations. Keeping them would lead to inconsistency of the axes in the figures.   
5.1 Main Sample Statistics 
Table 3: Main Sample Statistics.
4
 
Main Sample Statistics Percentiles Sample mean by groups 
Variable Mean St.Dev 5 % Med 95 % DNC FCC NMC 
Taxable Income 2 061 852 52 800 000 -1 005 070 226 130 5 545 285 882 118 10 700 000 23 500 000 
Total Assets 31 100 000 381 000 000 1 180 736 4 499 556 72 700 000 13 200 000 138 000 000 391 000 000 
Revenue 31 200 000 356 000 000 309 769 4 969 083 78 700 000 14 400 000 175 000 000 309 000 000 
TI / Revenue (y) 9.3226 % 26.5669 % -28.8481 % 4.7449 % 62.1662 % 9.4806 % 6.8648 % 8.1795 % 
TI / Assets 8.6920 % 24.5095 % -18.0576 % 4.9591 % 45.7176 % 8.8147 % 8.2691 % 5.8323 % 
TI / Equity 64.9747 % 91.0130 % -79.3354 % 23.8013 % 266.1033 % 52.9319 % 352.9638 % 21.4660 % 
Tang. Assets/TC 97.7768 % 7.5316 % 88.6763 % 100.0000 % 100.0000 % 97.8937 % 96.2927 % 96.4887 % 
IBD/TC 30.9162 % 87.0708 % 0.0000 % 14.5488 % 94.7074 % 31.2880 % 18.4629 % 37.0731 % 
Age 14.8501 12.9280 3.0000 11.0000 36.0000 14.6977 16.1676 17.3616 
Observations 471 396 
    
435 078 20 706 15 612 
 
As seen from Table 3, the majority of observations in the sample are of Domestic Norwegian 
corporations (DNCs). I have relatively few observations of Foreign Controlled (FCC) and 
Norwegian Multinational Corporations (NMC) compared to the observations of the domestic 
corporations. Obviously this influences the descriptive statistics. The mean taxable income 
                                                 
4
 In the table below, the NMC column corresponds to the DMNC column in Balsvik et al. (2009). I have carried over the 
notation for the two other groups, though I have excluded the DCC group from descriptive statistics. The statistics are not 
directly comparable, as I use the 2012 value of NOK, while Balsvik et al. (2009) deflates to the 1998 value of NOK. 
 29 
for FCCs and NMCs are 10.7 and 23.5 million NOK respectively, yet the sample mean is 
2.06 million NOK due to the low mean taxable income for DNCs. This is especially 
underlined as the mean taxable income for both FCCs and NMCs is much higher than the 
income at the 95% percentile. 
The story is the same for both assets and revenue. Foreign controlled and multinational 
corporations are significantly larger than the domestic Norwegian corporations. This 
influences the sample means, as both are substantially higher than the median of the sample. 
Foreign controlled corporations do on average hold assets worth ten times the average of the 
domestic national corporations group, while the multinational corporations are even bigger. 
In terms of revenue, the difference between foreign controlled and domestic corporations is 
similar to the difference in assets. The difference between foreign and multinational 
corporations is still large in revenue, but not as large as in assets. 
The taxable income in relation to revenue (TI / Revenue) ratio is the dependent variable and 
profitability measurement in this thesis. Again, I observe the mean of the sample being 
around twice the size of the median, which indicates that the sample is influenced by some 
corporations with very high profitability. Profitability does not seem to follow the trend of 
the previous sizes. It is the domestic Norwegian corporations that are the most profitable 
with an average profitability of 9.48%. Norwegian multinational corporations follow with an 
average profitability ratio of 8.17%, while the corresponding ratio for the foreign controlled 
corporations is 6.86%. Already in the descriptive statistics I thus find relatively large 
differences in average profitability between the nationality groups. 
An alternative profitability measurement (dependent variable) could be to use assets as 
denominator instead of revenue. The mean and median of the taxable income to assets ratio 
closely resembles the ones from the taxable income to turnover ratio. It differs from the TI / 
Revenue ratio in that the ratio is quite similar for foreign and domestic Norwegian 
corporations, and lower for the Norwegian multinational corporations. This could be caused 
by the fact that Norwegian multinationals have incorporated foreign affiliates in their 
balance sheets, thereby increasing their assets. Thus, it appears unlikely that taxable income 
in relation to assets will perform well as a dependent variable. 
Another possible alternative denominator in the dependent variable is equity. The taxable 
income to equity ratio does however suffer in the same way as the assets and revenue sizes 
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do. The mean of this ratio is much higher than the median of the sample. By looking at the 
ratios by groups I find that this abnormality is caused by the very high taxable income to 
equity ratio in foreign controlled corporations. At first glance, I thought the large size would 
have to be caused by mistake. By looking closer, I found around 4 300 observations of 
foreign controlled corporations with a taxable income to equity ratio above 1. As this is more 
than 20% of the sample of foreign controlled corporations, I can’t easily attribute the high 
ratio to a measurement error. The high ratio may be caused by rented equipment. Assuming 
that foreign controlled corporations to a larger degree than their Norwegian counterparts rent 
equipment and office spaces, less equity is necessary. Due to excessively high taxable 
income to equity ratio in foreign firms, it appears unlikely that this ratio will function well as 
an alternative dependent variable. 
The corporations in the sample have a very high level of tangible assets, indicated by the 
tangibility ratio of tangible assets to total assets. The average tangibility ratio is above 96% 
for every group, and the ratio is close to 98% for Norwegian corporations. This is further 
underlined by the fact that already at the sample median the tangibility ratio is 100%. At the 
5% percentile it remains high at 88.7%. Descriptive statistics do thus suggest that not many 
corporations have substantial intangible assets, even if most intangibles should be activated 
in the corporations’ balance sheet. Accounting practices do however allow some discretion, 
and some intangibles can be expensed immediately rather than activated. Rational managers 
will expense as early as possible, as it saves taxes. 
Similar to the findings of Tropina (2010), it appears as if Norwegian corporation have a 
higher debt ratio than foreign controlled corporations. This is somewhat surprising, as one of 
the main methods of profit shifting is thin capitalization. Descriptive statistics suggest that 
thin capitalization isn’t common in foreign corporations in Norway. Keep in mind however, 
that actual interest cost is unobserved. 
The average age of corporations in the sample is between 14 and 15 years, while the median 
is 11 years. This is somewhat as expected, as success or failure often is determined early in 
corporations’ existence. The Norwegian multinationals have the highest average age 
followed by foreign controlled corporations, while domestic Norwegian corporations have 
the lowest average age. As it is the international corporations that are oldest, it appears likely 
that corporations generally seek to acquire necessary financial and operational muscles in 
domestic markets before turning their attention internationally. 
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5.2 Taxable income to revenue ratio by groups of 
corporations over time 
As the dataset covers the timespan of the financial crisis of 2008, I thought it would be 
interesting to examine the dependent variable, taxable income to revenue ratio over time. 
Development of this variable is displayed by the nationality groups in Figure 2 and 3 below. 
Figure 2: Mean Taxable Income / Revenue ratio (Dependent variable) by groups of firms. 
 
Figure 3: Median Taxable Income / Revenue ratio (Dependent variable) by groups of firms. 
By looking at Figure 2 and 3, I observe that profitability for all three groups decreased from 
2007 to 2008. The financial crisis of 2008 may be a likely explanation to this. For the 
internationally exposed corporations profitability changed little between 2008 and 2009, 
though average profitability did increase in Norwegian corporations from 2008 to 2009. 
Assuming that the drop in profitability is due to the financial crisis of 2008, this can be 
explained by the fact that Norway was to a lesser extent than the rest of the world affected by 
the crisis. Foreign affiliates of Norwegian corporations may have had a harder time than 
their parent corporations in a tough economic situation in the rest of the world. 
6%
7%
8%
9%
10%
11%
12%
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
DNC FCC NMC
2%
3%
4%
5%
6%
7%
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
DNC FCC NMC
 32 
One interesting observation from Figure 2 is that it does not seem like the financial crisis 
was a shock that affected each nationality group equally. The profitability ratio for the 
foreign controlled corporations group seems relative flat and stable compared to the 
development in the ratio for Norwegian corporations. This indicates that foreign corporations 
possibly are more solid with a stronger brand with loyal customer than Norwegian 
corporations. It could also be explained by the fact that foreign controlled corporations have 
more flexible costs, and are able to adjust their cost level to changing economic trends. 
Finally, if foreign controlled corporations profit shift by internal transfer pricing, they may 
have shifted less profits and thereby reduced their costs. The decrease in profitability from 
2010 to 2011 further underlines this, as this development is not reflected in either of the 
other two nationality groups. 
5.3 Ownership Variable Statistics 
One of the main features of this paper is the introduction of a proxy variable that indicates if 
the CEO of a corporation also is the chairman of the board (CoB). The goal of this proxy 
variable is to indicate where it is possible for owners to receive wages as dividends. In table 
4 below, I illustrate how common this is in corporations in the sample. 
Number of observations DNC FCC NMC Sample 
CoB is employed 47.38 % 17.52 % 10.54 % 44.85 % 
Mean Taxable Income/Revenue (by CoB) DNC FCC NMC Sample Mean 
CoB is employed 10.72 % 8.97 % 8.39 % 10.68 % 
CoB is not emplyed 8.36 % 6.42 % 8.15 % 8.22 % 
Difference 2.36 % 2.56 % 0.24 % 2.46 % 
Mean Taxable Income (by CoB) DNC FCC NMC Sample Mean 
CoB is employed 603 042 4 484 509 6 693 519 717 051 
CoB is not emplyed 1 133 402 12 000 000 25 500 000 3 155 407 
Table 4: Ownership Variable Statistics. 
From table 4 I observe that in nearly 45% of the observations, the chairman of the board is 
the same person as the CEO. This is much more common in Domestic Norwegian 
Corporations (DNC), than in Foreign Controlled Corporations (FCC) or Norwegian 
Multinational Corporations (NMC). It is still surprisingly common in the corporations in the 
FCC group, where in 17.52% of the observations the chairman of the board is the same 
person as the CEO. 
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In table 4 I also observe the difference in profitability, measured by taxable income in 
relation to revenue between corporations where the owner is employed and not. This 
difference is quite substantial in both the DNC and FCC groups of corporation, which may 
indicate that owners either chose to receive wages as dividends or receive no wages at all. It 
is hard to imagine a different explanation for the differences found in these groups. The 
observed difference in the group containing Norwegian multinational corporations is 
comparatively small, which is a little surprising considering the differences observed in the 
other groups. The only likely explanation I can offer for this is that chairmen of Norwegian 
multinational corporations that are employed in the corporation as CEO are more likely to 
receive compensation comparable to professional CEOs. 
As figure 4 below indicates, the gap in profitability between corporations where the CEO 
also is the Chairman of the board seems stable over the analysis period. The difference 
seems to lie in the range of between 2 pp. and 3 pp. every year. Do note however that this 
figure is heavily influenced by the domestic Norwegian corporations. Figures isolating the 
profitability for all three nationalities of firms conditional on ownership can be found in 
Attachment 1. 
Figure 4: Profitability (Taxable income/Revenue) by ownership over time 
Corporations where the CoB is employed are in general smaller than corporations without an 
employed CoB measured at taxable income. This is as expected, as larger corporations are 
likely to require professional leadership.  Assuming that larger corporations are more likely 
to shift profits, some of the effect of size may be captured by the ownership variable instead 
unless size is well controlled for. As I control for size by using five quintiles of sales, I have 
illustrated the frequencies of the ownership variable by the sales quintiles in table 5. 
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 Quintiles of size (sales) 
Ownership Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Sum 
Owner is employed 46 414 50 312 46 676 40 741 27 269 211 412 
Owner is not employed 47 881 43 952 47 603 53 538 67 010 259 984 
In Percent 49.22 % 53.37 % 49.51 % 43.21 % 28.92 % 44.85 % 
Table 5: Ownership in quintiles of Size. 
The spread does seem quite evenly distributed with the exception for the final quintile which 
contains the largest corporations. In this quintile, the majority of observations are of firms 
where the CoB is not employed in the same corporation. This is relatively good news for my 
regression analysis, though it does seem like a good idea to separate the groups by size and 
analyse them individually in a robustness test. 
5.4 Size 
In this thesis I control for size by using five quintiles of sales. This is comparable to previous 
studies, but still problematic. One problem is the distribution of observations by size. Some 
corporations have very high sales compared to the majority of corporations in the sample. 
The frequencies are displayed in the kernel density figure displayed in figure 5 below: 
Figure 5: Frequencies by income (in million NOK) 
The area below the graph illustrates the probability of getting a sales value as indicated by 
the x axis. Figure 5 illustrates that there is a majority of observations with sales values 
between 0 and 20 million NOK.  Note that observations with sales income above 100 million 
NOK is left out of the density chart. 18 192 observations has a sales income higher than 100 
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million NOK. In terms of quintiles, this is a little problematic as the final sales quintile 
covers corporations of a quite wide range of sales income. In fact, this quintile covers sales 
income from 18.1 million to 59.4 billion NOK. The minimum and maximum values for each 
quintile are described in table 6 below. 
Income / Quintiles Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 
Min 0 1 280 934 3 469 644 7 146 859 18 100 000 
Max 1 280 910 3 469 638 7 146 753 18 100 000 59 400 000 000 
Observations 94 295 94 264 94 279 94 279 94 279 
Table 6: Minimum and Maximum values for the sales quintiles. 
Table 6 suggest that 5 sales quintiles may not be enough. As the income in the fifth quintile 
spreads from 18.1 million to nearly 60 billion NOK, this quintile covers a wide range of 
corporations and may not be able to capture effects typical for very large corporations, such 
as economics of scale. For this reason I have increased the number of sales quintiles to 20 in 
the robustness section (Section 8.1). 
Additionally, there may be endogeneity problems as sales income is used as the denominator 
in the dependent variable in addition to in the sales quintiles. Due to this, it is appropriate to 
lag the sales quintiles one year in the estimations. It is questionable to which extent last 
year’s sales impact profitability this year, but last year’s sales income is a good measure of 
the size of a corporation. Unfortunately, introducing lags to the model does mean that one 
less cross section is considered in the regression analysis. 
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6. Estimation Specification 
The basic specification of the ordinary least square regression used in this thesis is similar to 
the specification used in previous literature, among them Grubert et al. (1993), Klassen et al. 
(1993), Langli and Saudagaran (2004), Balsvik et al. (2009) and Tropina (2010). It has also 
been used in several master theses. The basic OLS specification is as follows 
             
          
                (1) 
Profitability (   ) is measured as the ratio between taxable income and total sales. 
Corporations are grouped by nationality and the groups are tested against a reference group 
in the estimation. The group variable (     express which group that is tested. It will either 
have the value FCC indicating that foreign controlled corporations are tested against the 
reference group domestic Norwegian corporations, or the value NMC indicating that 
Norwegian multinational corporations are tested against domestic Norwegian corporations. 
The coefficient in front of the group variable (    will express the estimated difference 
between the tested and reference group. This is the so-called unobserved difference between 
the nationality groups that the control variables are unable to capture. If the estimated 
coefficient has a positive sign, it indicates that the tested group has a higher profitability than 
the reference group. The expected sign of the group variable depends on the group tested. A 
regression of profitability on the group variable only without a constant will result in the 
same observed differences as in the descriptive statistics. However, it is assumed that 
profitability also varies with observable corporation specific characteristics. Additional 
variables are introduced in order to find the profitability difference conditional on the 
included control variables in    . The descriptive statistics did show that both size and debt 
ratio do vary between the nationality groups. Assuming that both size and debt ratio does 
affect profitability, the regression results will suffer from omitted variable bias unless these 
two factors are controlled for in the specification. In this specification I control for leverage, 
tangibility, size, age, and financial income. 
I also include year and sector dummies as control variables. The year dummies are meant to 
capture shocks in the economy that affect all the corporations in the sample, but are time 
dependent. The sector dummies are meant to capture permanent differences in profitability 
between different sectors. Also, I identify corporations where the owner is also the CEO by 
using a dummy variable. I suspect that the effect of this variable on profitability may be 
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slightly time-delayed. Owners have to keep their money invested in the corporation for over 
a year in order to fully utilize the tax free return on the invested capital 
(“Skjermingsfradraget”). The amount possible to withdraw as dividends without incurring 
taxes is a linear function of time. For example, if an owner starts a corporation in December, 
he can only withdraw (1/12 * Risk free return * Invested capital) for that year. Someone who 
starts a corporation in January may withdraw the full amount, equal to the risk free return 
multiplied with invested capital. Including the lagged ownership variable is an appropriate 
control for this. (Wooldridge, 2009, pp 483-484).      is the error term. 
One issue with the current specification and estimation method is as I repeatedly observe the 
same firm in the sample, it is no longer appropriate to assume that different observations are 
independent (Verbeek, 2012). The standard errors computed in an OLS regression is based 
on the assumption that the error terms are independently and individually distributed (i.i.d.). 
However, as I observe the same firm repeatedly in the sample it is likely that the error terms 
are correlated. For an instance, Maffini and Mokkas (2009) suggest that multinational 
corporations have a higher level of productivity. A corporations’ productivity level is 
unobserved in the sample. It will vary little over the period of time in the analysis, but it will 
definitively affect the dependent variable profitability. If the error term does in fact correlate 
with the dependent variable, the specification suffers from heteroscedasticity. This does not 
however mean that OLS is inefficient, as I will use a cluster-robust covariance matrix to 
adjust the standard errors for general forms of heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation (See 
Verbeek, 2012, pp 389-390). 
Another problem arises if the unobserved productivity or any other firm specific effect (    
is correlated with the nationality groups or any of the other explanatory variables. If so, the 
exogeneity assumption of the explanatory variables will be violated. The estimation 
specification will suffer from omitted variable bias, and the explanatory variables that 
correlate with the unobserved productivity will have biased coefficients. The exogeneity 
assumption could be violated for the ownership and nationality variables, which probably is 
correlated with number of employees and productivity. Number of employees is unobserved 
in the specification, though number of employees may not influence profitability.  
It is difficult to estimate the sign of the bias on the nationality variable. Assuming as shown 
by Maffini and Mokkas (2009) and Mayer and Ottaviano (2008), that it is the most 
productive firms that expand internationally, the OLS estimation likely overestimate the 
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coefficient of the multinational group. Balsvik and Heller (2009) find that acquisitions of 
Norwegian firms by foreign entities usually are of corporations in growth. This also suggests 
that the coefficient of the foreign controlled corporation group variable will be 
overestimated. For the purpose of interpreting the resulting coefficients, it means that the 
coefficients for the multinational and foreign controlled groups are likely to underestimate 
the assumed profit shifting for tax purposes by international firms in OLS. 
To control for the unobserved firm specific effects I use a fixed effects estimation, which also 
is commonly found in previous literature. This estimation method allows the intercept to not 
only vary between sectors, time, and ownership status, but also between individual firms. 
Assuming that firm specific effects    are constant over time, they will be removed by 
demeaning the equation in 1 as shown below. 
 ̈           ̅     ̈  
        ̈  
           ̈      (2) 
Where  ̈           ̅ (2) is the time-demeaned data on y and similarly for the explanatory 
variables and the error-term (Wooldridge, 2009). As specified in equation 2, the estimation is 
run on the deviation between the variables and their mean values. This also holds true for 
any variable that is constant over time. Unfortunately, this means that observations of firms 
where the variables do not vary within the period of time in the dataset will not be taken into 
account in the estimation. In the fixed effects estimation, I compare the change in 
profitability in corporations who are sold to foreign entities or bought back home, to the 
reference group of corporations which retain the nationality of their ownership during the 
analysis period. I also compare the change in profitability for corporations where the 
chairman of the board either becomes CEO, or steps down as CEO. As in the OLS 
estimation, the lag of the ownership variable is included. I suspect that in most cases the full 
effect of the fact that the CoB also is the CEO can’t be realized before the year after the 
owner assumes control. 
One problem with the fixed effects estimation method is however that measurement error 
may seriously influence the independent variables, and especially the nationality and 
ownership dummy variables. Corporations wrongly classified as either multinational or 
domestic one year and corrected the next, will be treated by fixed effects as a real change in 
nationality. If this is common, profitability may not change as the incentive and possibility to 
shift profits are still the same as before. Assuming that there are more cases of 
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misspecification of foreign ownership than cases where corporations do not report the 
change, the direction of the bias will be negative in absolute terms (It will lead to a 
coefficient estimated closer to zero than true). The same is true for the indicator variable 
which indicates if the chairman is CEO or not. From table 7.1 I notice that 1 393 
observations of chairmen becoming CEO changes back again to no role. One explanation 
can be that when corporations underperform, the chairman of the board assumes control of 
the corporation and then steps down when an appropriate candidate for CEO is found. 
However, the large amount of multiple changes suggests that measurement error also may be 
at cause. For this reason, firms who change nationality or ownership status twice or more are 
dropped, as described in section 4.4. 
Status Changes Observations 
Firm is National -> is Foreign Controlled 2 152 
Firm is Foreign Controlled -> is National 793 
Firm is National -> is Norwegian Multinational 1 767 
Firm is Norwegian Multinational -> is National 1 175 
Firm is NMC/FCC -> is DNC -> is NMC/FCC 324 
Firm is DNC -> is NMC/FCC -> is DNC 192 
CoB is not CEO -> is CEO 7 196 
CoB is CEO -> is not CEO 7 127 
CoB is not CEO -> is CEO  -> is not CEO 555 
CoB is CEO -> is not CEO -> is CEO 1 393 
Table 7.1: Status changes in Fixed Effects  
(Prior to the no multiple status changes restriction) 
 
Dropping the observations is unfortunate, but I trust the estimation results where the multiple 
status changes are dropped more than the estimation results containing the dropped data. I 
will however include the dropped observations in a robustness check in section 8. After 
dropping the multiple status changes, I am left with the following changes in nationality and 
ownership as described in table 7.2 below. 
 
Status Changes Observations 
Firm is National -> is Foreign Controlled 1 789 
Firm is Foreign Controlled -> is National 491 
Firm is National -> is Norwegian Multinational 1 468 
Firm is Norwegian Multinational -> is National 902 
CoB is not CEO -> is CEO 5 288 
CoB is CEO -> is not CEO 5 200 
Change in both Nationality and CoB=CEO 167 
Table 7.2: Status changes in Fixed Effects  
(After the no multiple status changes restriction) 
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7. Empirical Results 
7.1 Main Results 
Table 8 on the next page shows the estimated coefficients by both Pooled OLS and Fixed 
Effects estimations using the indirect method as described in section 2.2 and 2.3. Please note 
that I do control for year and sector by dummies where this is appropriate, but these 
variables are omitted from the table due to size limitations. In the main regression output, 
Norwegian Multinational Corporations (NMCs) and Foreign Controlled Corporations 
(FCCs) are tested against the reference group Domestic Norwegian Corporation (DNC). An 
F test for heterogeneity suggests that firm specific effects are correlating with my 
explanatory variables, thus the estimated coefficients in OLS suffers from omitted variable 
bias. For this reason, fixed effects should be considered as the preferable estimation method. 
Surprisingly, I find a positive coefficient for the Norwegian multinational corporations in 
OLS. As the coefficient becomes insignificant in the fixed effects estimation, I can’t claim 
that these corporations are more or less profitable than domestic Norwegian firms. The 
insignificance of the fixed effect estimation could also possibly be caused by the fact that for 
some firms, Norway will be a low tax country. Under such circumstances, these firms would 
prefer to profit shift to Norway rather than away from it. Also, the positive OLS coefficient 
may be caused by the fact that corporations in the multinational group are more productive 
or efficient. Productivity and efficiency is unobserved firm specific effects that prior 
research has found to correlate with multi-nationality of firms (Mayer & Ottaviano, 2008), 
which will result in omitted variable bias in the nationality variable in OLS. 
The sign of the FCC coefficient is negative as expected. OLS estimates the profitability 
differential between domestic Norwegian firms and Foreign controlled firms to be 1.18 
percentage points (pp.). Fixed effects estimates that corporations which become foreign 
controlled suffer a fall in profitability of 1.09 pp. The difference between the OLS and fixed 
effects estimate is likely to be caused by a negative correlation between the unobserved firm 
specific effects and the foreignness of firms, suggesting that these firms are less productive 
or efficient. Given the estimated coefficients, it seems like foreign controlled corporations 
are less profitable than domestic Norwegian corporations, and this difference cannot be 
explained by either removing firm specific effects or my included control variables. 
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Table 8: Main Regression Results. 
Variable Coefficient 
 OLS Fixed Effects 
Norwegian Multinational (NMCs) 0.0147
***
 -0.0045 
 (0.0033) (0.0048) 
Foreign Controlled (FCCs) -0.0118
***
 -0.0109
*
 
 (0.0025) (0.0050) 
Ownership Indicator 0.0106
***
 -0.0036 
 (0.0024) (0.0024) 
Ownership Indicatort-1 0.0061
*
 0.0047
*
 
 (0.0024) (0.0023) 
Int. Bearing Debt / Tot. Capital -0.2448
***
 -0.2128
***
 
 (0.0026) (0.0047) 
Financial Income / Equity 0.9053
***
 0.6875
***
 
 (0.2013) (0.1690) 
Tangible Assets / Assets 0.2506
***
 0.1180
***
 
 (0.0089) (0.0138) 
Age Group 2 0.0080
***
 -0.1650
***
 
 (0.0019) (0.0005) 
Age Group 3 0.0208
***
 -0.1326
***
 
 (0.0019) (0.0003) 
Age Group 4 0.0342
***
 -0.1504
***
 
 (0.0020) (0.0003) 
Sales 2 t-1 0.0217
***
 -0.0042 
 (0.0026) (0.0034) 
Sales 3 t-1 -0.0191
***
 -0.0123
***
 
 (0.0027) (0.0037) 
Sales 4 t-1 -0.0318
***
 -0.0224
***
 
 (0.0027) (0.0039) 
Sales 5 t-1 -0.0353
***
 -0.0270
***
 
 (0.0028) (0.0043) 
Constant -0.1740 0.1795
***
 
 (108.8189) (0.0140) 
Year dummies Yes Yes 
Sector dummies (3 digit NACE) Yes No
5
 
adj. R
2
 0.186 0.027 
Reference group DNC DNC 
N 315 019 318 490 
Robust Standard errors corrected for clustering in parentheses 
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***
 p < 0.001 
                                                 
5 Sector dummies are not included in fixed effects as firm specific effects will capture the effect of sector. 
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The ownership variable which indicates if the chairman of the board also is employed in the 
same corporations is positive as expected, and significant in its current and lagged form in 
OLS. It is only significant when lagged once in fixed effects. This does indicate that 
corporations where the chairman of the board is employed in the same corporation are more 
profitable than corporations with professional leadership. It also does suggest that the effect 
of the variable is slightly delayed. OLS suggests that profitability in corporations where the 
CoB was employed as CEO the previous year is 0.61 pp. higher than in other corporations, 
and 1.06 pp. higher than in other corporations if the CoB is the current CEO. Fixed effects 
estimate that corporations where the CoB becomes the CEO experience an increase in 
profitability of 0.47 pp. the following year. Similar to the coefficient of the Norwegian 
multinational variable, the coefficient of the ownership variable falls from between OLS and 
fixed effects, though only slightly for the lagged form. This suggests that firm specific 
effects are positively correlated with the ownership variable, or that firms where the CoB is 
employed possibly are more productive or efficient than comparable corporations with 
professional management. 
Among the other control variables, coefficients signs and sizes are mostly as expected. 
Profitability falls with increased debt, and increases with financial income. The coefficient 
for the financial income to equity ratio is positive and significant. A change to this ratio 
should convert into a higher profitability, as all else equal, a higher financial income should 
increase taxable income. Financial income has a rather large coefficient of around 90.53 %. 
in OLS, and 68.75 %. in the fixed effects estimation. The large coefficient can be explained 
by the fact that the denominator is equity, and not income. 
Profitability increases with the tangibility ratio which is tangible assets in relation to total 
assets. The interpretation of this variable is a little difficult, as different guidelines and rules 
for intangibles exist for the corporations in the sample. If anything, one would expect 
profitability to increase with the amount of intangibles due to licensing fees and other 
income related to intangibles. The problem is that not every corporation recognize all 
intangibles in their balance sheet. The descriptive statistics do show that the average of this 
ratio is very high across all the groups. Only small changes are thus expected to the 
underlying ratio. The large drop in coefficient estimates between fixed effects and OLS do 
suggest that firm specific effects correlates positively with the tangibility ratio. 
 43 
The age groups contain corporations grouped by age as described in section 4.3. These are 
significant and positive in OLS, which indicates that older corporations in general are more 
profitable. In fixed effects the signs of the age groups are negative. This does indicate that 
corporation which changes group as they become older become less profitable.  One possible 
explanation to this is that the highest profitability levels are found early in the sample. 
Allowing some time for corporations to change their age group could lead to this variable 
capturing some of the effect which the year dummies were supposed to capture. It could also 
indicate that older corporations are less mobile with high levels of fixed costs, and that they 
are slow to adapt. See Figure 2 and Figure 3 in section 5.2 for the development in 
profitability over time. 
It’s a little bit different with the lag of sales groups, which are supposed to indicate size of 
corporations. The estimated coefficients for the lagged sales groups are negative in both OLS 
and fixed effects for groups 3 to 5, which indicate that larger corporations are less profitable. 
I am inclined to believe in the coefficients of the fixed effects estimation. Increasing sales is 
nearly always expensive. Given that a corporation expand and change sales group one year, 
it is plausible that it will have to increase costs or lower prices to maintain this position the 
following year. The OLS coefficients suggest that profitability peak in corporations 
belonging in sales group 2 and then decline throughout the following groups. I expected the 
opposite, that the larger corporations would be more profitable. Further, the difference in 
coefficients between OLS and fixed effects is positive for the second quintile and negative 
for the rest. The differences between OLS and fixed effects are also quite similar for the final 
three quintiles, suggesting the same level of productivity. Coefficients in OLS and fixed 
effects of the sales quintiles thus surprisingly suggest that corporations in the second quintile 
are the most efficient. 
7.2  Comparison with previous studies 
In this section I will compare my estimated coefficients with the results of Langli & 
Saudagaran (2004), Balsvik et al. (2009) and Tropina (2010). I will also attempt to isolate 
the effect of the change in tax regimes in 2006. It is most relevant to compare with the 
studies of Balsvik et al. (2009) and Tropina (2010) as both of these include a fixed effects 
estimation. Additionally, both papers separate between domestic and foreign multinational 
corporations. Langli & Saudagaran (2004) uses OLS on traditional industry and retail 
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sectors, but does only distinguish between Norwegian controlled and foreign controlled 
corporations. Their coefficient is thus likely to be influenced by the fact that Norwegian 
multinational corporations are left in the reference group when testing for differences. Table 
9 displays the estimated coefficients for both the OLS and fixed effects estimation of the 
mentioned previous studies and the ones estimated in this thesis. 
  OLS FE 
 Coefficient NMC FCC NMC FCC 
1 Langli & Saudagaran (2004)  -2.57   
2 Balsvik et al. (2009) -1.44 -2.47 -1.14 -1.70 
3 Tropina (2010) -1.26 -3.43 -1.29 -1.97 
4 My results (2013) 1.47 -1.18 -0.04 -1.09 
5 Results without the ownership variable 1.16 -1.54 -0.04 -1.10 
(5-2) Difference Balsvik et al. (2009) 2.60 0.93 1.10 0.60 
(5-3) Difference Tropina (2010) 2.42 1.89 1.25 0.87 
Table 9: Comparison of coefficients in selected previous studies.
6
  
All estimates in percentage points. 
 
My estimated coefficients are generally higher than those estimated in previous studies. The 
OLS estimate of Norwegian multinational corporations is also positive, which is opposite of 
what the other studies have found. It is in the coefficient for the foreign controlled 
corporations estimates vary most. My OLS estimated FCC coefficient of -1.18 pp. is just 
above 1/3 of the estimated coefficient by Tropina (2010). The OLS estimated FCC 
coefficient of Balsvik et al. (2009) and Langli & Saudagaran (2004) is closer, but still more 
than twice the size of my coefficient. 
 
In fixed effects the differences between the estimated coefficients are smaller both for 
Norwegian multinational and foreign controlled corporations. Most notably, I find no 
differences in profitability between Norwegian multinational and domestic Norwegian 
corporations. Unlike in the previous studies, the fixed effects estimated coefficient of -0.04 
pp. for Norwegian multinational corporations is insignificant. This could either indicate that 
Norwegian multinational corporations are less susceptible to profit shifting, or that they 
possibly profit shift to Norway. 
                                                 
6 Tropina’s results are found in table 6 on page 28 in Tropina (2010). Her DMNC and FMNC coefficients corresponds to 
my NMC and FCC coefficients. Balsvik et al. (2009) uses the same notation as Tropina (2010). Their results are found in 
table 8 on page 58 in Balsvik et al. (2009). 
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My estimated coefficient for the foreign controlled corporations is significant and closer to 
zero than previously found. The difference between the coefficients for this group in mine 
and previous studies is not as big as for the Norwegian multinational corporations, or those 
estimated by OLS. While being more in line with previous research, it still entertains the 
possibility that the profitability differential previously found has been influenced by the dual 
income tax system, and owners who receive wages as dividends. 
Unfortunately I find similar coefficients when I leave the ownership variable out of the 
estimation
7
. This is slightly surprising considering the difference in profitability between 
corporations where the chairman of the board is CEO or not (See section 5.3 and attachment 
1). I do observe changes to the coefficients in the OLS estimation. The ownership variable 
seems to have increased the difference in profitability between domestic Norwegian and 
Norwegian multinational corporations, while reducing the profitability difference between 
domestic Norwegian and foreign controlled corporations. Both nationality coefficients are 
near equal in the fixed effects estimation where the coefficient of the foreign controlled 
corporations falls by 0.01 pp. excluding the ownership indicator. This indicates that the 
ownership variable reduces the difference in profitability between domestic Norwegian and 
foreign controlled corporations, but only barely. 
Obviously, it is only corporations who change nationality status which is counted in fixed 
effects. There are only 167 observations of corporations changing both ownership and 
nationality. By removing the ownership variable, the effect of change in ownership of these 
167 observations is spread across other explanatory variables that ownership correlate with. 
The similar coefficients with and without the ownership variable in fixed effects seems thus 
to be caused by the fact that I have too few observations of corporations who change both 
nationality and ownership status. 
A second explanation is that ownership does not influence profitability. Considering the 
descriptive statistics of section 5.3 I find this hard to believe. As I utilize data from after the 
tax regime change in 2006 however, it may have a weaker effect than it would under the dual 
income tax system which previous studies were carried out under. I don’t have data for the 
                                                 
7 See attachment 2 for the regression output with the ownership variable omitted 
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period before 2006, thus it is not possible to estimate the effect of changing regimes, or the 
“difference in difference” by changing regimes.  
As my coefficients estimated in fixed effects don’t change much when leaving out the 
ownership variable, the difference in coefficients between those estimated in mine and those 
estimated in prior studies should mostly be attributed to the change in tax regimes. This 
difference in coefficients between mine and previous results could then be interpreted as an 
approximation for a difference-in-difference. Coefficients estimated by fixed effects suggests 
that limiting dividends under the new tax regime resulted in a reduction in the profitability 
difference between domestic Norwegian and Norwegian multinational corporations of 
between 1.10 pp. and 1.25 pp. Similarly, it led to a reduction in the profitability difference 
between domestic Norwegian and foreign controlled firms of between 0.60 pp. and 0.87 pp. 
There is no obvious reason to why the profitability difference between domestic Norwegian 
and Norwegian multinational corporations were reduced more than the difference in 
profitability between domestic Norwegian and foreign controlled corporations. Assuming 
that both groups of corporations have equal means and will to profit shift, it shouldn’t be 
different. It could possibly indicate that the extent of profit shifting in foreign controlled 
corporations has increased, or the extent profit shifting to Norway by Norwegian 
multinational corporations has increased compared to previous studies. A second, but 
perhaps unlikely explanation could be that owners of Norwegian multinational corporations 
employed in the same corporation, received labour compensation as dividends to a larger 
extent than in domestic Norwegian corporations. 
I find a smaller profitability differential between foreign and Norwegian firms compared to 
previous studies. Unlike previous studies, I find no difference between Norwegian 
multinational and domestic Norwegian corporations. The reason for this is probably both due 
to the introduction of the ownership variable, but also due to the change in tax regimes in 
2006. Without comparable data before and after the change in tax regimes, finding the 
accurate effect of each is difficult. Still, the relative clear difference in coefficients between 
mine and previous studies suggest that these earlier studies may have been influenced by the 
fact that some owners chose to receive wages as dividends under the dual income tax system.  
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8. Robustness 
In this section I will try to make small changes to either my variables or sample to check if 
my estimations are robust and valid even while using different assumptions. I will also try to 
find profitability differentials conditional on size and sector. 
8.1 Size by sales quintiles 
First I want to see if I can find differences in profitability conditional on the five size 
quintiles that I control for in the main regression, and also if introducing several more size 
quintiles improve the model in section 7. In table 10 below I’ve estimated the coefficient of 
Norwegian Multinational (NMC) and Foreign Controlled Corporations (FCC) individually 
by 5 quintiles of size, or sales. Significant coefficients are bolded. The difference in 
observations between the OLS and the FE estimation is due to missing variables for sector. 
Observations missing sector are dropped in the OLS estimation, but kept in the FE 
estimation. 
Table 10: Norwegian Multinational and foreign controlled corporations by quintiles of sales. 
 Sales 1 Sales 2 Sales 3 Sales 4 Sales 5 
 OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE 
NMC -0.0437 -0.0290 -0.0256 -0.0112 -0.0198 -0.0306 -0.0153 -0.00458 0.00486 -0.00253 
 (0.0520) (0.0502) (0.0225) (0.0220) (0.0157) (0.0207) (0.0107) (0.0127) (0.00306) (0.00496) 
FCC -0.0180 0.00712 0.00241 -0.00364 -0.0310*** 0.00508 -0.0301*** -0.0137 -0.0102*** -0.00853 
 (0.0160) (0.0336) (0.0109) (0.0188) (0.00683) (0.0170) (0.00488) (0.00808) (0.00248) (0.00555) 
adj. R2 0.173 0.032 0.237 0.027 0.203 0.023 0.184 0.022 0.159 0.024 
N 54 248 54 696 57 696 58 339 64 548 65 316 69 162 70 014 69 365 70 125 
DNC 53 365 53 791 55 977 56 579 62 295 63 016 65 462 66 242 53 508 54 077 
NMC 119 121 389 398 719 730 1 362 1 382 8 214 8 314 
FCC 764 784 1 330 1 338 1 534 1 570 2 338 2 390 7 643 7 734 
Robust Standard errors corrected for clustering in parentheses. 
Industry is controlled for in OLS by 3 digit NACE codes. 
All control variables included, but omitted from the table. 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
 
Tax planning and profit shifting is complex (Russo et al, 2007), which suggest that it is 
usually the larger corporations who have the means to do so. Additionally, there are 
generally fewer observations of foreign and multinational firms in the first two quintiles. 
Balsvik et al. (2009) do find significant differences for the FCC group in all sales quintiles in 
their OLS estimation, and in all but the first and last quintile using fixed effects. Tropina 
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(2010) finds the FMNC
8
 variable significant in all sales quintiles in OLS, and in the final 
three quintiles using fixed effects. While their findings are in line with research about size 
and profit shifting, I see no such tendencies in my sample. I find no significant differences in 
fixed effects for any of the sales quintile. In OLS I find differences in the final three quintiles 
with the expected sign for foreign controlled corporations. The insignificance of fixed effects 
however suggests that all of these coefficients correlate with firm specific effects. This 
correlation seems negative for foreign controlled corporations and positive for Norwegian 
Multinational corporations in the final sales quintile, though this coefficient is insignificant 
in both OLS and fixed effects. 
 
I have previously mentioned the weakness with using 5 quintiles of sale as a proxy for size. 
Especially, the results of 7.1 (Main Regression) is not quite as expected, seeing negative 
signs for the coefficient in nearly all five quintiles in both OLS and Fixed Effects. 
Additionally the sales spread in the final quintile was quite large. Using several more 
quintiles of sales seems to yield better results. Please see table 12 for the regression of 
profitability conditional on the lag of 20 sales quintiles. In this regression, the OLS 
estimation of the size quintiles has the expected positive sign, while the quintiles containing 
larger corporations are negative in fixed effects. Neither the nationality variables nor the 
other control variables change much between the regressions with 5 and 20 sales quintiles. 
The OLS estimation suggests that it is the corporations in the first eight quintiles which are 
the most profitable compared to the base which is the quintile with the least sales, though 
later quintiles are also more profitable. Though insignificant, this is reflected in the fixed 
effects estimation which indicate that corporations who change quintiles to one of the first 
eight quintiles become more profitable, while changes to any later quintile seems to be 
followed by a fall in profitability. This is plausible considering the cost of expansion. 
 
Like in table 10, it does not seem like I find any differences estimated by fixed effects in 
profitability between the nationality groups when I estimate by 20 quintiles of sales instead 
of 5. These coefficients are displayed in attachment 3. I do however find several differences 
in OLS. 
 
                                                 
8 Tropina’s (2010) FMNC variable corresponds to my FCC variable. 
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Table 11: 20 Quintiles of Sales. 
 OLS FE 
Norwegian Multinational Corporation 0.0161*** -0.0001 
 (0.0034) (0.0043) 
Foreign Controlled Corporation -0.0123*** -0.0114** 
 (0.0025) (0.0043) 
Ownership Indicator 0.0075*** -0.0044* 
 (0.0019) (0.0019) 
Ownership Indicatort-1 0.0082*** 0.0049** 
 (0.0019) (0.0019) 
Int. Bearing Debt / Tot. Capital -0.2445*** -0.2121*** 
 (0.0026) (0.0046) 
Financial Income / Equity 0.9052*** 0.6903*** 
 (0.2006) (0.1690) 
Tangible Assets / Assets 0.2516*** 0.1155*** 
 (0.0086) (0.0135) 
Age Group 2 0.0063*** -0.0410 
 (0.0019) (0.0463) 
Age Group 3 0.0188*** -0.0714 
 (0.0018) (0.0491) 
Age Group 4 0.0320*** -0.0264 
 (0.0020) (0.0463) 
Sales 2 t-1 0.0707*** 0.0100 
 (0.0054) (0.0061) 
Sales 3 t-1 0.0883*** 0.0090 
 (0.0054) (0.0069) 
Sales 4 t-1 0.1022*** 0.0108 
 (0.0053) (0.0072) 
Sales 5 t-1 0.1115*** 0.0113 
 (0.0052) (0.0073) 
Sales 6 t-1 0.1007*** 0.0069 
 (0.0051) (0.0074) 
Sales 7 t-1 0.0805*** 0.0009 
 (0.0050) (0.0073) 
Sales 8 t-1 0.0628*** 0.0015 
 (0.0049) (0.0073) 
Sales 9 t-1 0.0561*** -0.0009 
 (0.0049) (0.0073) 
Sales 10 t-1 0.0513*** -0.0034 
 (0.0049) (0.0073) 
Sales 11 t-1 0.0444*** -0.0087 
 (0.0048) (0.0073) 
Sales 12 t-1 0.0422*** -0.0104 
 (0.0048) (0.0074) 
Sales 13 t-1 0.0374*** -0.0157* 
 (0.0048) (0.0074) 
Sales 14 t-1 0.0362*** -0.0194** 
 (0.0048) (0.0074) 
Sales 15 t-1 0.0337*** -0.0235** 
 (0.0048) (0.0075) 
Sales 16 t-1 0.0328*** -0.0240** 
 (0.0048) (0.0076) 
Sales 17 t-1 0.0352*** -0.0267*** 
 (0.0048) (0.0077) 
Sales 18 t-1 0.0314*** -0.0290*** 
 (0.0048) (0.0079) 
Sales 19 t-1 0.0273*** -0.0293*** 
 (0.0049) (0.0081) 
Sales 20 t-1 0.0325*** -0.0249** 
 (0.0051) (0.0085) 
_cons -0.1569*** 0.0882* 
 (0.0105) (0.0388) 
adj. R2 0.191 0.028 
N 323357 326837 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Sector and year controlled for with dummies where appropriate. 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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8.2 Estimation by sectors 
In table 12.1 to table 12.4 I have estimated the profitability difference between domestic 
Norwegian and foreign controlled corporations, and also between domestic and Norwegian 
multinational corporations by sectors according to the 2007 NACE Standard.
9
 
Like in the previous studies of Balsvik et al. (2009) and Tropina (2010) I do find differences 
in several sectors, though unfortunately not in many. The coefficients found in this study are 
not directly comparable to those estimated in previous studies, as I distinguish between more 
sectors. Surprisingly, I notice that foreign corporations in the primary sector are more 
profitable than Norwegian corporations. Foreign controlled corporations are estimated to be 
16 pp. more profitable than Norwegian corporations in OLS. The coefficient for Norwegian 
multinationals is 10.9 pp., though this coefficient is insignificant. I find no significant sizes 
in the fixed effects estimation. There are few observations of foreign and multinational firms 
in this sector, which may cause the high coefficients in OLS. I find no significant differences 
in the manufacturing, electrical or water supply and renovation sectors.  
In the construction sector I find the estimated coefficients to have the expected sign. The 
OLS estimation does indicate that foreign controlled corporations on average are 2.02 pp. 
less profitable than domestic Norwegian corporations. Norwegian multinational corporations 
have the opposite, positive sign, but it is insignificant. I find no differences in the automotive 
and trade (which includes retail and wholesale) sectors, while I again find a positive OLS 
coefficient for Norwegian multinationals in the transportation and storage sectors. 
Norwegian multinationals are seemingly more profitable than domestic Norwegian 
corporations in this sector, but that could be explained by efficiency differences in the firm 
specific effects correlating with the nationality variable. 
I find the first significant difference in fixed effects in the Hotels and Restaurant sector. 
Corporations that become foreign controlled suffer a fall in profitability of 8.92 pp. This 
coefficient is indeed rather large, and may be caused by the relatively few observations of 
foreign firms in this sector. Further, I find no differences in the IT & Communications or 
Finance & Insurance sector. Previous literature has previously found the larger differences to 
                                                 
9 See http://www4.ssb.no/stabas/ClassificationFrames.asp?ID=342101&Language=nb for the breakdown of sectors in the 
2007 NACE Standard. 
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exists in the finance sector, but I am unable to find any significant differences in this sector. I 
do find significant sizes in the real estate sector in OLS, but as these are insignificant in the 
fixed effects estimation firm specific effects may be at cause. 
Table 12.1: Regression by sectors – Significant sizes bolded. 
 Primary Sector Manufacturing El-Supply Water & Renovation 
 OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE 
NMC 0.0109 0.0318 0.0002 -0.0058 0.0520 -0.0160 0.0214 0.0053 
 (0.0152) (0.0328) (0.0061) (0.0100) (0.0277) (0.0293) (0.0154) (0.0354) 
FCC 0.160** 0.0655 0.0041 -0.0102 -0.0266 -0.0334 -0.0252 -0.0646 
 (0.0590) (0.0532) (0.007) (0.0113) (0.0575) (0.0939) (0.0254) (0.216) 
adj. R2 0.090 0.054 0.099 0.039 0.071 0.029 0.099 0.044 
N 6 552 6 552 22 783 22 783 2 127 2 127 1 482 1 482 
DNC 6 220  19 739  1 642  1 271  
NMC 268  1 671  433  146  
FCC 64  1 373  52  65  
Standard errors in parentheses 
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***
 p < 0.001 
 
 
Table 12.2: Regression by sectors – Significant sizes bolded. 
 Construction Automotive/Trade Transportation/Storage Hotels/Restaurants 
 OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE 
NMC 0.0191 -0.0049 -0.00443 -0.0059 0.0424*** 0.0038 -0.0284 -0.0109 
 (0.0101) (0.0155) (0.0038) (0.0065) (0.0107) (0.0241) (0.0145) (0.0141) 
FCC -0.0202* -0.0134 0.0042 -0.0026 -0.0146 -0.0328 -0.0294 -0.0892* 
 (0.0085) (0.0138) (0.003) (0.0076) (0.0088) (0.0293) (0.0191) (0.0451) 
adj. R2 0.072 0.049 0.074 0.020 0.080 0.030 0.108 0.050 
N 41 991 41 991 73 895 73 895 13 512 13 512 10 136 10136 
DNC 40 468  66 823  11 933  9 754  
NMC 839  2 116  830  249  
FCC 684  4 956  749  133  
Standard errors in parentheses 
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***
 p < 0.001 
 
 
Table 12.3: Regression by sectors – Significant sizes bolded. 
 IT & Com. Finance/Insurance Real Estate Service (Educated) 
 OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE 
NMC 0.0153 0.0050 0.0093 0.104 0.0492*** -0.0099 -0.0037 0.0038 
 (0.0124) (0.0167) (0.0349) (0.0764) (0.0098) (0.0120) (0.0159) (0.0255) 
FCC -0.0053 -0.006 -0.0268 -0.0457 -0.0261* 0.0047 -0.0014 -0.0346* 
 (0.0087) (0.0140) (0.0308) (0.0404) (0.0121) (0.0154) (0.0089) (0.0164) 
adj. R2 0.135 0.024 0.133 0.032 0.169 0.035 0.148 0.019 
N 11 111 11 111 3 568 3 568 70 582 70 582 26 936 26 936 
DNC 9 275  3 484  66 929  25 107  
NMC 609  198  2 441  443  
FCC 1 227  186  1 212  1 386  
Standard errors in parentheses 
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***
 p < 0.001 
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Table 12.4: Regression by sectors – Significant sizes bolded. 
 Service (Un.) Education Health Culture Service (Other) 
 OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE 
NMC 0.0698*** 0.0145 -0.0001 0.0270 -0.0223 -0.0737*** -0.0102 -0.0597 0.0507 -0.00843 
 (0.0160) (0.0202) (0.0314) (0.0467) (0.0219) (0.0181) (0.108) (0.0380) (0.0541) (0.0382) 
FCC -0.0002 0.0083 0.0064 0.0184 -0.0374 -0.0531*** -0.0105 0.0119 0.0240 0.0670* 
 (0.0092) (0.0202) (0.0377) (0.0490) (0.0210) (0.0130) (0.0321) (0.0193) (0.0305) (0.0327) 
adj. R2 0.078 0.025 0.167 0.036 0.230 0.038 0.131 0.015 0.078 0.020 
N 11 578 11 578 2 185 2 185 9 829 9 829 3 158 3 158 3 513 3 513 
DNC 10 140  2 105  9 482  3 011  3 446  
NMC 454  7  53  25  19  
FCC 984  73  294  122  48  
Standard errors in parentheses 
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***
 p < 0.001 
 
In the professional service sector, foreign controlled corporations have a lower estimated 
profitability in fixed effects. The estimation suggests that profitability in corporations in this 
sector falls with 3.46 pp. when the corporation becomes foreign controlled. In the OLS 
estimation this coefficient is insignificant, but that could be due to the firm specific effects 
biasing this coefficient positively. In the uneducated service sector I find no differences in 
fixed effects, but the OLS estimates suggests that Norwegian multinational corporations are 
more profitable. This is not necessarily true, as again the insignificance of fixed effects 
suggests a correlation of firm specific effects with the multi-nationality variable. I find no 
differences in the education or culture sectors. 
I find one of the largest negative profitability differences in the health sector. None of the 
OLS estimates are significant, but fixed effects estimates a fall in profitability of 7.37 pp. for 
corporations which become multinational. Corporations that become foreign controlled 
suffer a similar, but not as large fall in profitability. The estimated difference for this group 
is 5.31 pp. Though perhaps a little ironic that it is the iconic health sector which is found to 
have such a large profitability differential between Norwegian and Norwegian multinational 
or foreign firms, it’s not very surprising. The sector is very intangible assets and specialized 
equipment intensive. This allows managers discretion to subjectively value licensed IP and 
traded specialized equipment, which makes it possible to easily profit shift across borders. 
The final significant estimated size is found in the final service sector. A little surprisingly, it 
seems like corporations that become foreign controlled increases their profitability with 6.7 
pp. Do note the few observations of foreign firms in this sector though, which likely 
influences the estimates.  
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To summarize, I do find several significant differences across sectors, though in several 
sectors I find that multinational corporations has a positive sign in OLS. This is most likely 
due to the presence of firm specific effects that affects profitability positively, and which 
correlates positively with the multinational variable. I find negative differences in 
profitability in fixed effects in the Hotels & Restaurants, Professional Service and Health 
sectors. Do however take into consideration that few observations of foreign and Norwegian 
multinational firms may cause the significance of these coefficients. Compared to previous 
literature, I find lower profitability differences in fewer sectors. This is likely due to a 
number of reasons. The unobserved profitability differential between Norwegian, Norwegian 
multinational and foreign firms may have been reduced due to the change in tax regime and 
the addition of the ownership indicator. Authors of previous studies have also had more 
observations over a longer period of time available. I also distinguish between more sectors. 
8.3 Profitability measurements / Dependent variable 
It is quite common in previous literature to test different profitability measurements. 
Unfortunately, as the dataset I have was constructed for my purposes it is very specialized, 
and there are few denominators for taxable income to choose from. The alternative 
denominators I can utilize are assets/total capital or equity, which also are utilized in 
previous studies.  
The findings in the descriptive statistics in section 5.1 indicate that both asset and equity will 
perform badly as denominator in the dependent variable. Also, both denominators are 
already used in the explanatory variables, so the results may become spurious by introducing 
the same denominator in the dependent variable (Kronmal, 1993). For the complete 
estimation of both denominators please consult attachment 4 (Assets/Total Capital) and 5 
(Equity).  
Using assets/total capital as denominator for the dependent variable causes in general the 
estimated nationality coefficients to become higher in absolute value, and both have the 
expected negative sign. The OLS estimation of the NMC coefficient is -1.27 pp., while the 
FCC coefficient is estimated to be -1.33 pp. In fixed effects, the NMC indicator has a 
negative coefficient of 2.68 pp., while the FCC indicators value is quite similar at -2.70 pp. 
Both nationality variables increase in absolute value compared to the main estimation in 
section 7.1 where taxable income to sales income was used as profitability measure. This is 
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likely due to the fact that the ownership variable becomes insignificant in the estimation with 
total capital as denominator for taxable income. The similarity of the FCC and NMC 
coefficients is likely a result of the relative higher level of assets for the Norwegian 
multinational corporations, which is probably caused by the fact that Norwegian 
multinational carriers the value of affiliates in their balance sheet. For this reason, it is not 
possible to compare Norwegian multinational corporations and domestic Norwegian 
corporations. Further, it is slightly surprising how weakly significant financial income is in 
OLS. In fixed effects, the estimated coefficient for financial income is insignificant. The 
sales groups do get the expected positive sign in OLS and the expected negative sign in fixed 
effects. 
Using equity as denominator should according to Balsvik et al. (2009), “work best”. In my 
estimation, it doesn’t. Nearly every coefficient loses significance when I use taxable income 
over equity as dependent variable. Not even the nationality indicators are significant. The 
adjusted R square of the model is 0. Apparently, using equity as a denominator doesn’t 
reveal much, except perhaps that my explanatory variables do not substantially affect the 
taxable income to equity ratio. There are several reasons which may explain this. The most 
likely however is that the spread in this ratio is probably much larger in the taxable income 
to equity than the taxable income to turnover ratio, which should lie between -1 and 1. This 
is also as suggested by descriptive statistics in section 5.1. Theoretically, corporations can 
get away with very low levels of equity and rather finance by debt. This means that some 
corporations with very low equity and high debt may have substantially high pre-tax income, 
even after interest costs. 
8.4 Sample selection 
Running the estimation on the whole sample gives no comprehensible answer. The adjusted 
R Square is 0, and no variable is significant. This may be due to several reasons, but the 
most likely is including the small corporations with assets less than one million NOK, of 
which there are about 400 000 observations of in a total sample size of 1.2 million. 
Additionally, several corporations with income less than zero are included, and influence the 
coefficients. When the spread and the number of extreme values increases, it is more 
difficult to estimate significant coefficients. 
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In the main regression I drop observations of firm who changes status in either nationality or 
ownership more than once. I suspect the reason for the multiple changes is a result of 
misspecification. It is however possible that these changes are real changes. For this reason I 
run the estimation again with the previously dropped observations included. This regression 
output can be found in attachment 6. I find quite similar nationality coefficients in this 
regression compared to the main regression in section 7. Additionally, the current ownership 
coefficient becomes significant and negative in fixed effects, while the lagged coefficient 
retains it sign and decrease slightly in value. In the OLS estimation both are positive and 
significant. If the multiple changes were a result of misspecification, I would expect a lower 
significance the ownership variables, but the opposite is actually true. The negative 
coefficient of the current ownership variable is not as expected, but it could indicate that the 
chairman of the board assume control of corporations performing badly. Multiple changes in 
nationality and ownership do not however seem to overly influence the nationality variables, 
left out or included.  
I also restrict the sample further. The most logical further restriction is to delete every 
observation where the asset side and the equity and debt side of the balance sheet do not 
match. However, by doing so I only have just over 108 000 observations left to run the 
estimations on. This regression output can be found in attachment 7. The nationality 
variables become insignificant, and several of the sector and age groups are dropped because 
of collinearity.  
8.5 Summary of Robustness 
I find no clear differences in profitability between foreign controlled and Norwegian 
multinational corporations compared to domestic Norwegian corporations conditional on the 
sales quintiles, even when using 20 quintiles of sales instead of the 5 commonly utilized in 
previous studies. However, it seems like the main estimation results become more in line 
with economic theory and expectations by using 20 quintiles of sales rather than just 5. The 
reason for this is probably due to the extreme spread of income in the final sales quintile 
when only utilizing five quintiles. The coefficients of the nationality variables and the 
ownership indicator do not change much between the regressions with 5 and 20 quintiles of 
sales. Further, I do find that the profitability differential is sector dependent. I only find few 
profitability differences when estimating by sector in fixed effects compared to previous 
 56 
studies. This is likely due to both the fact that my ownership indicator now captures some of 
the effect of the profitability differential between domestic Norwegian and international 
firms, but also due to the fact that my dataset covers a shorter period of time than found in 
previous studies. 
As the descriptive statistics in 5.1 suggest, neither the taxable income to assets ratio nor 
taxable income to equity ratio seem to function as profitability measurements or as 
dependent variables in my estimation. Despite this I find significant differences in 
profitability between the nationality groups in fixed effects when using assets as 
denominator for taxable income. The negative and significant coefficients for Norwegian 
multinationals are not surprising, as these corporations carry the value of affiliates in their 
balance sheet. The fact that the income to equity ratio has found to be working well in 
previous studies surprises me. One possible explanation to why it doesn’t in my estimation is 
that the extent of leasing, renting and gearing has increased between the years, which allows 
corporation to function without a high amount of assets or equity. 
Including small, Norwegian corporations of assets of less than 1 million NOK and 
corporations with negative income presents some problems, as all my variables become 
insignificant. This is due to the fact that the sample is less homogenous, and come as no 
surprise. The results are similar when I exclude all corporations where the asset and debt & 
equity sides of the balance sheet do not match. I end up with too few observations to find 
significant sizes in fixed effects. 
The nationality coefficients do not change much by including the relatively few observations 
of corporations who change nationality or ownership status twice or more. They do however 
affect the ownership indicator, which become negative in its current form. This does indicate 
that corporations where the chairman of the board assume control is less profitable, but it 
may also be due to simple measurement error. Lagged once, the ownership indicator retains 
it positive sign and significance. 
None of the above makes me doubt my main estimated coefficients for the nationality 
variables, which signs and coefficients are plausible and easily can be explained. Yes, the 
estimated nationality and the ownership indicator change substantially by using a different 
profitability measurement, which it should as it doesn’t measure the taxable income to sales 
ratio anymore, but rather return on assets and equity. 
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9. Conclusion 
In this thesis, I have tried to estimate the unobserved difference in profitability between 
Norwegian and international firms under the 2006 tax regime in Norway. I suspect that the 
result of previous studies on the subject in Norway may be affected by the fact that under 
some circumstances under the pre 2006 tax regime, it would be profitable for owners who 
were employed in the corporation they owned to receive wages as dividends rather than 
personal income. In such cases, the profitability of the corporation would increase; less 
wages were paid which would increase profits before taxes. In order to answer the 
hypotheses presented in section 3, I use both a descriptive and an empirical analysis. 
In the descriptive analysis I find a relatively clear unconditional difference between domestic 
Norwegian and foreign controlled corporations. There also seems to be a difference between 
domestic and Norwegian multinational corporations, though this difference is not as large as 
the one between foreign controlled and domestic Norwegian firms. I further find that the 
profitability of foreign firms were more stable throughout the financial crisis, which indicate 
that these corporations have a higher degree of flexible costs than Norwegian firms. 
Profitability seems to depend on ownership, as I find a higher profitability in corporations 
where the chairman of the board is the same person as the CEO. This is especially true in 
Norwegian corporations. Though dividends at a low tax rate were limited in the 2006 tax 
reforms act, there are still incentives to receive at least some of the compensation as 
dividends rather than personal income. 
In the empirical analysis I try to estimate the profitability difference between both domestic 
Norwegian and Norwegian multinational corporations, and domestic Norwegian and foreign 
controlled firms conditional on a set of explanatory variables. I control for ownership by 
introducing a variable which indicates where a corporations’ chairman of the board also is 
the CEO. This variable is supposed to capture the effect of wages as dividends. I also 
introduce control variables typically found in financial statements, and I use the lag of sales 
as a proxy for the corporation size. Conditional on my explanatory variables and after 
controlling for fixed effects I find no differences between Norwegian and Norwegian 
multinational corporations. I do however find a slight difference between foreign controlled 
and domestic Norwegian corporations. The ownership variable is significant lagged once, 
with a positive sign which indicates that the effect of ownership might be delayed. 
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To answer the hypotheses in section 3, based on the empirical analysis I find that ownership 
influences profitability positively. The lag of this variable has a positive coefficient of 0.47 
pp. I find a lower profitability in foreign controlled firms compared to Norwegian firms, the 
difference between these groups is 1.09 percentage points estimated in fixed effects. I do not 
find a similar difference between domestic Norwegian and Norwegian multinational firms. 
The null of [H1] and [H2] are thus rejected, while I keep the null of [H3].  
Though some foreign firms probably do shift profits away from Norway, it is impossible to 
indicate to which extent the estimated difference in profitability between foreign controlled 
and domestic Norwegian corporations is a result of profit shifting. The estimated difference 
in profitability between domestic Norwegian and foreign firms of 1.09 pp. must be 
interpreted as the maximum level of profit shifting. I find no differences in profitability 
between domestic Norwegian and Norwegian multinational corporations. As I assume that 
Norwegian owners are no less susceptible to profit shifting than foreign owners, this could 
be explained by the fact that for some corporations, Norway is a low tax country. These 
corporations would thus rather profit shift to Norway, rather than away from it. 
Compared to previous studies, I find smaller differences between domestic Norwegian and 
foreign controlled firms. Unlike previously found, I find no differences between domestic 
Norwegian and Norwegian multinational corporations. This is probably due to both the 
inclusion of the ownership variable, but also due to the change in tax regimes in 2006. My 
estimated results suggest that previous studies have been influenced by the fact that some 
owners chose to receive compensation as dividends instead of personal income. Changing 
profitability measurement to return on assets, I find a lower profitability in both 
multinational and foreign controlled corporations compared to the domestic Norwegian 
corporations. 
For future research on the same subject, I would suggest using different controls for size. 
Perhaps number of employees could be a good indicator. Further, including the sizes 
dividends and wages could possibly answer how much dividends active owner chose to 
receive as opposed to wages. However, I still believe the most important thing is the quality 
of the dataset, number of observations and number of observed years since 2006. With the 
quality of the data from the Norwegian Tax Administration it should be simple to identify 
clearer differences as the number of observations grows. 
 59 
10. References 
[1]  Alstadsæter, A. & Wangen, K.R. (2010) Small corporations’ income shifting through 
choice of ownership strcture, a Norwegian Case. Finnish Economic Papers, Vol. 23 
No. 2, 2010. 
[2] Balsvik, R., Jensen, S., Møen, J. & Tropina, J. (2009) Kunnskapstatus for hva 
økonomisk forskning har avdekket om flernasjonale selskapers internprising i Norge, 
Samfunn og Næringslivsforskning, prosjekt nr 1374. Rapport No. 11/09. 
 
[3] Bartelsman, E.J. & Beetsma, R. (2003) Why pay more? Corporate tax avoidance 
through transfer pricing in OECD countries. Journal of Public Economics, No. 87, 
2003. 
 
[4] Bergstrand, J. (2009) Accounting for Management Control. Studentlitteratur AB, 
Lund, 2009. 
 
[5] Bernard, J.T. , Jensen J.B., Schott P.K. (2006) Transfer Pricing by U.S.-based 
Multinational Firms, National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper, 2006, 
No 12493, 2006. 
 
[6] Bergin, T. (2012) Special report: How Starbucks avoid UK taxes. Reuters, October 
5th 2012 [Internet] Available from http://uk.reuters.com/article/2012/10/15/us-
britain-starbucks-tax-idUKBRE89E0EX20121015 [Retrieved 14.05.2013] 
[7] Buettner, T., Overesch, M., Schreiber, U. & Wamser, G. (2006) The impact of thin-
capitalization rules on multinationals’ financing and investment decisions. CESifo 
working paper, No. 1817, 2006. 
[8] Contractor, F.J., Kundu, S.K. & Hsu, C. (2003) A Three-Stage Theory of 
International Expansion: The Link between Multinationality and Performance in the 
Service Sector. Journal of International Business Studies, Vol. 34, No. 1, pp. 5-18, 
2003. 
 60 
[9] Devereux, M.P. (2006) The impact of Taxation on the location of capital, firms and 
profit: a survey of empirical evidence. Oxford University Center for Business 
Taxation Working Paper series, WP 07/02, 2006. 
[10] Dischinger, M. & Riedel, N. (2011) Corporate taxes and the location of intangible 
assets within multinational firms. Journal of Public Economics, No 95, 2011, pp 691-
707, 2011. 
[11] Ekeberg, E. (2013) Disse betaler ikke skatt, Klassekampen, January 25th 2013 
[Internet] Available from http://klassekampen.no/61124/article/item/null/disse-
betaler-ikke-skatt [Retrieved 14.05.2013] 
[12] Grubert, H., Goodspeed, T. & Swenson, D. (1993) Explaining the low taxable 
income of foreign-controlled companies in the United States. Studies in international 
taxation, University of Chicago Press. Chapter 7, pp 237-276, 1993. 
[13] Grubert, H. (1997) Another look at the low taxable income of foreign-controlled 
companies in the United States. Office of Tax Analysis, paper No. 74, 1997. 
[14] Harris, D., Morck, R., Slemrod, J. & Yeung, B. (1993) Income shifting in U.S. 
multinational corporations. Studies in international taxation, University of Chicago 
Press. Chapter 8, pp 277-308, 1993. 
[15] Harris, D.G. (1993) The Impact of U.S. Tax, Law Revision on Multinational 
Corporations’ Capital Location and Income-Shifting Decisions. Journal of 
Accounting Research Vol. 31 Supplement 1993. 
[16] International Financial Reporting Standards (2012) International Accounting 
Standard 11 – Construction Contracts (IAS 11) [Internet] Available from 
http://www.ifrs.org/Documents/IAS11.pdf [Retrieved 28.05.2013] 
[17]  International Financial Reporting Standards (2012) International Accounting 
Standard 38 - Intangibles (IAS 38) [Internet] Available from 
http://www.ifrs.org/IFRSs/Documents/English%20IAS%20and%20IFRS%20PDFs%
202012/IAS%2038.pdf [Retrieved 28.05.2013] 
[18] Keuschnigg, C. & Devereux, M.P. (2009) The distoring arm’s length principle, 
Centre for Economic Policy Research Discussion Paper, No. 7375, July 2009. 
 61 
[19] Kinney, M. and Lawrence, J. (2000) An Analysis of the Relative U.S. Tax Burden of 
U.S. Corporations Having Substantial Foreign Ownership, National Tax Journal, 
2000. 
[20] Klassen, K., Lang, M., & Wolfson, M. (1993) Geographic Income Shifting by 
Multinational Corporations in Response to Tax Rate Changes. Journal of Accounting 
Research Vol. 31 Supplement 1993. 
[21] Kumar, N. & Wright, O. (2012) Google boss: I’m very proud of our tax avoidance 
scheme. The Independent, December 13th 2012 [Internet] Available from 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/google-boss-im-very-proud-of-
our-tax-avoidance-scheme-8411974.html [Retrieved 14.05.2013] 
[22] Kronmal, R.A. (1993) Spurious Correlation and the Fallacy of the Ratio Standard 
Revisited. Journal of the Royal Statistical Society. Series A (Statistics in Society), 
Vol. 156, No. 3(1993), pp. 379-392 
[23] Langli, J. C., & Saudagaran, S. M. (2004) Taxable Income Differences Between 
Foreign and Domestic Controlled Corporations in Norway. European Accounting 
Review, Vol. 13, No. 4, pp 713–741, 2004. 
[24] Maffini, G. og Mokkas, S. (2009) Profit-shifting and measure of productivity of 
multinational firms. Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation. Working paper 
09/20. 
[25] Mayer, T., & Ottaviano, G.I.P (2008) The Happy Few: The Internationalisation of 
European Firms. Intereconomics. May/June 2008, pp 135-148. 
[26] NRS 8, Norsk Regnskapstandard (2011) NRS 8 God regnskapsskikk for små foretak 
[Internet] Available from: http://www.regnskapsstiftelsen.no/arch/_img/9519487.pdf 
[Retrieved 14.05.2013] 
[27] NTB (2013) EU-Stater vil ha mer rettferdig selskapskatt, Dagens Næringsliv, 
February 16th 2013 [Internet] Available from 
http://www.dn.no/forsiden/utenriks/article2564400.ece [Retrieved 14.05.2013] 
 62 
[28] PWC (2012) International transfer pricing 2012, 2012 [Internet] Available from 
http://www.pwc.com/gx/en/international-transfer-pricing/assets/norway.pdf pp 627-
639 [Retrieved 14.05.2013] 
[29] Regnskapsloven (1998) Lov om årsregnskap m.v. July 17th 1998 nr 56. Available 
from http://www.lovdata.no/all/hl-19980717-056.html 
[30] Russo, R. Finnerty, C. Merks, P & Petriccione, M (2007) Fundamentals of 
International Tax Planning, IBFD, Amsterdam. 
[31] Schjelderup, G. (2013) Form og substans: Flernasjonale selskaper og 
skatteplanlegging. Samfunnsøkonomen, Nr 1, 2013, pp 26-31. 
[32] Skatteloven (1999) Lov om skatt av formue og inntekt av March 26th 1999. Available 
from http://www.lovdata.no/all/nl-19990326-014.html  
[33] Sættem, J.B. (2013) Seks av ti betaler ikke skatt. Norks rikskringkasting, January 
23rd 2013. [Internet] Available from http://www.nrk.no/okonomi/6-av-10-betaler-
ikke-skatt-1.10880287 [Retrieved 07.06.2013] 
[34] Tomter, L. (2013) Disse undro mest skatt i 2012. Norsk rikskringkasting, January 
15th 2013. [Internet] Available from http://www.nrk.no/okonomi/29-millarder-
unndratt-skatt-i-fjor-1.10872655 [Retrieved 14.05.2013] 
[35] Tropina, J. (2010). Tax income differences between multinational and domestic 
corporations in Norway: A panel data approach. SNF project no 1185, Profit-shifting 
in Norway: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis. Working Paper No. 05/10. 
[36] UNCTAD (1992) World investment report 1992: Transnational Corporations as 
engine of growth [Internet] United Nations. Available from 
http://unctad.org/en/Docs/wir92ove.en.pdf [Retrieved 14.05.2013] 
[37] UNCTAD (2009) World investment report 2009 Transnational Corporations, 
agricultural production and development [Internet] United Nations. Available from 
http://unctad.org/en/docs/wir2009_en.pdf [Retrieved 14.05.2013] 
 63 
[38] US Public Interest Research Group (2012) Picking up the tab [Internet] U.S. PIRG. 
Available from http://uspirgedfund.org/reports/usf/picking-tab [Retrieved 
22.05.2013] 
[39] Verbeek, M. (2012) A guide to Modern Econometrics 4e. John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 
Rotterdam. 
[40] Wooldrigde, J. M. (2009) Introductory Econometrics - A Modern Approach 4e. 
South-Western Cengage Learning, Michigan. 
[41] WTO (2013) World Trade Organization, Statistics database [Internet] Available from 
http://stat.wto.org [Retrieved 03.06.2013] 
 64 
11. Attachments 
Attachment 1: Profitability conditional on the ownership statistics by nationality of Firms. 
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Attachment 2: Ownership indicator omitted 
 
 OLS FE 
Norwegian Multinational Corporations 0.0116
***
 -0.00450 
 (0.00329) (0.00482) 
Foreign Controlled Corporations -0.0154
***
 -0.0110
*
 
 (0.00253) (0.00498) 
Int. Bearing Debt / Tot. Capital -0.245
***
 -0.213
***
 
 (0.00259) (0.00473) 
Financial Income / Equity 0.908
***
 0.687
***
 
 (0.202) (0.169) 
Tangible Assets / Assets 0.254
***
 0.118
***
 
 (0.00894) (0.0138) 
Age Group 2 0.00851
***
 -0.165
***
 
 (0.00191) (0.000528) 
Age Group 3 0.0214
***
 -0.133
***
 
 (0.00187) (0.000334) 
Age Group 4 0.0352
***
 -0.150
***
 
 (0.00199) (0.000334) 
Sales 2t-1 0.0211
***
 -0.00419 
 (0.00261) (0.00340) 
Sales 3 t-1 -0.0210
***
 -0.0124
***
 
 (0.00266) (0.00370) 
Sales 4 t-1 -0.0350
***
 -0.0225
***
 
 (0.00265) (0.00391) 
Sales 5 t-1 -0.0406
***
 -0.0270
***
 
 (0.00273) (0.00429) 
Constant -0.166 0.180
***
 
 (117.9) (0.0139) 
adj. R
2
 0.185 0.027 
N 315 019 318 490 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Sector and year controlled for with dummies where appropriate. 
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***
 p < 0.001 
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Attachment 3: Nationality coefficients by 20 quintiles of sales. 
 OLS FE 
 Nationality Coefficients 
Quintile NMC FCC NMC FCC 
1 -0.0347 0.0379 -0.1264 -0.0156 
2 0.0985 -0.0701* 0.0352 -0.0610 
3 -0.0630 -0.0379 -0.0628 0.0987 
4 -0.1640* -0.0043 -0.0474 0.0443 
5 0.0017 0.0094 -0.0784 0.0551 
6 -0.0363 -0.0082 -0.0452 0.0144 
7 -0.0600 -0.0273 -0.0305 -0.0097 
8 -0.0217 0.0246 0.0036 -0.0284 
9 -0.0162 -0.0413** -0.0975* 0.0082 
10 -0.0479 -0.0312* -0.0157 -0.0215 
11 -0.0434 -0.0361** -0.0826 -0.0010 
12 0.0160 -0.0267* 0.0292 -0.0362 
13 -0.0756** -0.0299** -0.0186 0.0254 
14 -0.0145 -0.0218* 0.0301 -0.0054 
15 0.0069 -0.0215** 0.0005 -0.0212 
16 -0.0021 -0.0409*** -0.0197 -0.0243 
17 0.0292* -0.0219** 0.0060 -0.0109 
18 -0.0124 -0.0157** -0.0005 -0.0175 
19 -0.0066 -0.0222*** -0.0031 -0.0117 
20 0.0093** -0.0028 -0.0014 -0.0111 
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***
 p < 0.001 
 
  
 67 
Attachment 4: Assets/Total Capital as denominator in dependent variable 
 
 OLS FE 
Norwegian Multinational Corporations -0.0127
*
 -0.0133
**
 
 (0.00536) (0.00490) 
Foreign Controlled Corporations -0.0268
***
 -0.0270
***
 
 (0.00321) (0.00538) 
Ownership Indicator 0.0145
*
 0.00617 
 (0.00720) (0.0105) 
Ownership Indicatort-1 0.00421 0.00154 
 (0.00680) (0.00444) 
Int. Bearing Debt / Tot. Capital -0.201
***
 -0.265
***
 
 (0.00251) (0.00797) 
Financial Income / Equity 0.550
*
 0.202 
 (0.216) (0.219) 
Tangible Assets / Assets 0.342
***
 0.164
***
 
 (0.0122) (0.0220) 
Age Group 2 -0.0000248 -0.0756
***
 
 (0.00221) (0.000893) 
Age Group 3 -0.00232 -0.00253
***
 
 (0.00231) (0.000567) 
Age Group 4 -0.00646
**
 -0.0484
***
 
 (0.00229) (0.000567) 
Sales 2t-1 0.0236
***
 -0.00632
**
 
 (0.00119) (0.00206) 
Sales 3 t-1 0.0162
***
 -0.0213
***
 
 (0.00146) (0.00278) 
Sales 4 t-1 0.0151
***
 -0.0420
***
 
 (0.00162) (0.00343) 
Sales 5 t-1 0.0332
***
 -0.0514
***
 
 (0.00187) (0.00451) 
Constant -0.211 0.0564
*
 
 (76.71) (0.0221) 
adj. R
2
 0.123 0.028 
N 315 019 318 490 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Sector and year controlled for with dummies where appropriate. 
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***
 p < 0.001 
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Attachment 5: Equity as denominator in dependent variable 
 
 OLS FE 
Norwegian Multinational Corporations -0.300 -0.498 
 (0.219) (0.622) 
Foreign Controlled Corporations 0.0349 -0.265 
 (0.196) (0.278) 
Ownership Indicator -0.0157 0.248 
 (0.181) (0.251) 
Ownership Indicatort-1 -0.301 -0.527 
 (0.164) (0.278) 
Int. Bearing Debt / Tot. Capital -0.304 -0.915 
 (0.271) (0.988) 
Financial Income / Equity 29.83 34.00 
 (57.77) (72.27) 
Tangible Assets / Assets 2.811
**
 -7.227 
 (0.884) (9.798) 
Age Group 2 0.163 -0.358
**
 
 (0.424) (0.123) 
Age Group 3 -0.144 0.0622 
 (0.250) (0.0832) 
Age Group 4 -0.0793 -0.293
***
 
 (0.271) (0.0832) 
Sales 2 t-1 0.0440 0.609 
 (0.235) (0.512) 
Sales 3 t-1 0.314 0.577 
 (0.300) (0.382) 
Sales 4 t-1 0.484 0.926
*
 
 (0.299) (0.457) 
Sales 5 t-1 0.208 0.880 
 (0.257) (0.491) 
Constant -2.066 7.515 
 (.) (9.687) 
adj. R
2
 0.001 -0.000 
N 315 019 318 490 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Sector and year controlled for with dummies where appropriate. 
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***
 p < 0.001 
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Attachment 6: Multiple status changes included 
 
 OLS FE 
Norwegian Multinational Corporations 0.0145
***
 -0.0003 
 (0.0032) (0.0043) 
Foreign Controlled Corporations -0.0129
***
 -0.0119
**
 
 (0.0024) (0.0043) 
Ownership Indicator 0.0081
***
 -0.0043
*
 
 (0.0019) (0.0019) 
Ownership Indicatort-1 0.0087
***
 0.0051
**
 
 (0.0019) (0.0019) 
Int. Bearing Debt / Tot. Capital -0.2433
***
 -0.2118
***
 
 (0.0025) (0.0046) 
Financial Income / Equity 0.9108
***
 0.6924
***
 
 (0.2013) (0.1690) 
Tangible Assets / Assets 0.2524
***
 0.1144
***
 
 (0.0086) (0.0135) 
Age Group 2 0.0055
**
 -0.0433 
 (0.0019) (0.0460) 
Age Group 3 0.0179
***
 -0.0717 
 (0.0018) (0.0488) 
Age Group 4 0.0311
***
 -0.0287 
 (0.0020) (0.0460) 
Sales 2 t-1 -0.0800
***
 Omitted 
 (0.0038)  
Sales 3 t-1 -0.0386
***
 -0.0052 
 (0.0022) (0.0057) 
Sales 4 t-1 -0.0629
***
 -0.0179
**
 
 (0.0022) (0.0058) 
Sales 5 t-1 -0.0610
***
 0.0895
*
 
 (0.0096) (0.0384) 
Constant 0.189 0.028 
 323357 326837 
adj. R
2
 0.0145
***
 -0.0003 
N (0.0032) (0.0043) 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Sector and year controlled for with dummies where appropriate. 
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***
 p < 0.001 
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Attachment 7: Sample further restricted 
 
 OLS FE 
Norwegian Multinational Corporations 0.0095 -0.0139 
 (0.0052) (0.0105) 
Foreign Controlled Corporations -0.0091
*
 -0.0145 
 (0.0042) (0.0103) 
Ownership Indicator 0.0031 -0.0043 
 (0.0045) (0.0056) 
Ownership Indicatort-1 0.0151
***
 0.0089 
 (0.0044) (0.0052) 
Int. Bearing Debt / Tot. Capital -0.2870
***
 -0.2374
***
 
 (0.0042) (0.0107) 
Financial Income / Equity 0.9640
**
 0.5413
*
 
 (0.3534) (0.2234) 
Tangible Assets / Assets 0.2441
***
 0.0968
**
 
 (0.0145) (0.0326) 
Age Group 2 0.0065
*
 Omitted 
 (0.0032)  
Age Group 3 0.0208
***
 -0.1308
***
 
 (0.0032) (0.0008) 
Age Group 4 0.0370
***
 Omitted 
 (0.0034)  
Sales 2 t-1 0.0401
***
 -0.0151
*
 
 (0.0041) (0.0070) 
Sales 3 t-1 -0.0172
***
 -0.0285
***
 
 (0.0043) (0.0078) 
Sales 4 t-1 -0.0353
***
 -0.0392
***
 
 (0.0043) (0.0085) 
Sales 5 t-1 -0.0435
***
 -0.0484
***
 
 (0.0045) (0.0091) 
Constant -0.2555
***
 0.1558
***
 
 (0.0153) (0.0331) 
adj. R
2
 0.206 0.027 
N 108 718 109 871 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Sector and year controlled for with dummies where appropriate. 
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***
 p < 0.001 
 
